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A CHANGING OF THE GUARD: THE PROPRIETY OF APPOINTING 
GUARDIANS FOR FETUSES 
Close to thirty years after Roe v. Wade,1 Jean Reith Schroedel wrote, 
“[r]egardless of the specific policy, the fundamental dilemma remains 
balancing the rights of the fetus and the rights of the pregnant woman. . . .  
While Roe, perhaps unwittingly, began the balancing act between the woman 
and the fetus, subsequent cases permanently fixed it in the legal debate.”2  
Schroedel’s assessment of the “balancing” involved in fetal rights law and 
policy is increasingly evidenced by judicial and legislative efforts to extend 
legal rights to fetuses, including those areas of law in which the fetus’s rights 
conflict with the rights of the mother.3  Many oppose increased fetal rights in 
any context, arguing that independent legal status for fetuses “diminishes a 
woman’s rights, creating a continuous ‘slippery slope’ of state intervention into 
women’s lives.”4  Cynthia Daniels writes that the notion that the fetus has 
rights “has generated a deep crisis . . . which throws into question women’s 
rights to self-sovereignty, to work, and to due process under the law . . . and 
one that suggests the tenuous nature of women’s hold on liberal citizenship.”5  
By contrast, those in favor of fetal rights argue that Roe’s holding does not 
 
 1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 2. JEAN REITH SCHROEDEL, IS THE FETUS A PERSON?  A COMPARISON OF POLICIES 
ACROSS THE FIFTY STATES 44-45 (2000). 
 3. For example, the extension of personhood status to the fetus in wrongful death tort cases 
has, in Schroedel’s view, “contributed to the trend of viewing the fetus as a person with 
independent rights in civil law.”  Id. at 174.  Fetal rights have also expanded in criminal homicide 
law and in the prosecutions of mothers for prenatal substance abuse during pregnancy.  Id. at 105-
106, 137.  However, courts extending such rights to fetuses in non-abortion contexts are careful to 
deny any implications for Roe’s holding that a fetus is not a person for purposes of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  For example, the Mississippi Supreme Court recently held that the term “person” in 
the Mississippi wrongful death statute includes a “quick” fetus.  66 Fed. Credit Union v. Tucker, 
853 So. 2d 104, 112 (Miss. 2003).  The court offered assurance that Roe “is not implicated here” 
because the mother’s fundamental right to privacy is not involved when considering a third 
party’s negligence.  Id. at 113-14. 
 4. SCHROEDEL, supra note 1, at 44.  See also Janet Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions & 
Interventions: What’s Wrong with Fetal Rights, 10 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 9 (1987); Dawn E. 
Johnsen, Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts With Women’s Constitutional Rights to 
Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599 (1986). 
 5. CYNTHIA R. DANIELS, AT WOMEN’S EXPENSE: STATE POWER AND THE POLITICS OF 
FETAL RIGHTS 1 (1993).  Daniels goes on to say that many challenge the expansion of fetal rights 
as “yet another attempt to reinstate social domination over women.”  Id. at 3. 
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preclude states from recognizing and protecting the legal interests of fetuses 
outside the abortion context.6  They also argue that advancing medical 
technology, which increasingly reveals the independent humanity of the 
unborn, provides tangible evidence of a protectible human being prior to birth.7 
When the abortion right is at issue, States cannot legally extend rights per 
se to fetuses but have a recognized interest from conception in protecting 
potential human life under the Supreme Court’s 1992 decision Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey.8  In that case, the Court held that States may protect this 
interest by regulating abortion at any point in pregnancy, so long as the 
regulation does not place an undue burden on the woman’s right to choose.9  
Thus, while a woman’s right to a pre-viability abortion remained intact after 
Casey, the undue burden test gave more weight to the State’s interest than had 
Roe and required a more significant showing to invalidate an abortion 
regulation.10  The result has been a balancing of conflicting rights in abortion 
and non-abortion situations, sometimes a conflict that is between the fetus’s 
rights and the mother’s rights and sometimes between the State’s interest in the 
fetus and the mother’s rights. 
A relatively recent question in this balancing act has been whether a court 
may properly appoint a guardian for a fetus in various court proceedings.  
Representative types of cases in which guardians are sought or appointed 
include “forced medical treatment cases, []cases involving allegations of 
substance abuse during pregnancy,” and abortion cases.11  There is, however, 
no consensus as to whether and in what situations such an appointment is 
proper.  For example, in Alabama, courts have allowed a guardian for the fetus 
during proceedings in which a minor seeks a judicial bypass of parental 
 
 6. See generally Jeffrey A. Parness & Susan K. Pritchard, To Be or Not To Be: Protecting 
The Unborn’s Potentiality of Life, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 257 (arguing that some courts under Roe 
have incorrectly applied the denial of personhood under the Fourteenth Amendment to non-
abortion contexts).  See also Charles I. Lugosi, Respecting Human Life in 21st Century America: 
A Moral Perspective to Extend Civil Rights to the Unborn from Creation to Natural Death, 48 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 425 (2004). 
 7. SCHROEDEL, supra note 2, at 4-5.  It is worth noting that both pro-life and pro-abortion 
advocates see granting fetuses rights outside of abortion as logically suspect.  Those who favor 
abortion rights believe that any fetal rights ultimately threaten the right to abortion, and should be 
opposed.  Those against abortion argue that the growing trend towards fetal rights is one of the 
reasons to call into question the continued recognition of the abortion right.  See DANIELS, supra 
note 5, at 3-4.  Both sides recognize the difficulty in maintaining the analytical distinction 
between fetal rights when abortion is at issue and when it is not. 
 8. 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992). 
 9. Id. at 878. 
 10. Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Taft, 353 F.3d 436, 443 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting that one 
of Casey’s goals was “restor[ing] a balance of interests between women seeking abortions and 
states seeking to regulate abortions by reasserting the importance of the states’ interests”). 
 11. Susan Goldberg, Of Gametes and Guardians: The Impropriety of Appointing Guardians 
Ad Litem For Fetuses and Embryos, 66 WASH. L. REV. 503, 521 (1991). 
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consent to have an abortion.12  By contrast, the Florida Supreme Court has held 
such an appointment in a similar situation “clearly improper.”13  Justifications 
for allowing the appointments center on either the need to protect the rights of 
the fetus in non-abortion related proceedings,14 or the need to protect the 
State’s interest in the potential life of the fetus in abortion related 
proceedings.15  By contrast, opponents of guardian appointments argue that 
guardianship statutes do not make provision for appointment of a fetal 
guardian, and thus the appointment is statutorily improper.16  Others argue that 
as a practical matter, a guardian would have difficulty ascertaining the best 
interests of a fetus without resorting to personal moral judgments.  
Furthermore, they contend that the appointment creates an adversarial 
relationship between the woman and fetus that is “ultimately inimical to the 
promotion of the interests of both woman and fetus.”17  Finally, opponents of 
guardians for fetuses contend that such an appointment strikes at the heart of 
the right of a woman to choose abortion by tacitly—and improperly under 
current law—recognizing the fetus as a “person” and placing an undue burden 
on women.18  These are the basic contours of the arguments in what some have 
called the “wave of the future” in abortion regulations.19 
This Comment will argue that appointing guardians for fetuses in court 
proceedings involving a “maternal-fetal” conflict is necessary and proper under 
 
 12. In re Anonymous, 720 So. 2d 497, 500 (Ala. 1998) (holding that a guardian did not have 
a statutory right to appeal but nowhere indicating that such appointment was improper).  By 2001 
in Alabama, there had been at least seventeen instances in which minors seeking to waive 
parental consent had been questioned by an appointed representative of the fetus. Helena 
Silverstein, In The Matter of Anonymous, A Minor: Fetal Representation in Hearings to Waive 
Parental Consent For Abortion, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 69, 87 (2001). 
 13. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1190 (Fla. 1989) (holding that the appointment of a 
guardian ad litem for the fetus was “clearly improper,” but offering no reasoning for its decision 
on that issue). 
 14. See Anonymous, 720 So. 2d at 503.  Here, the dissent argued that Rule 17(c) of the 
Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, which historically had been applied to protect the property 
interests of the unborn and also had been used in divorce proceedings, ought to be used to require 
the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the fetus in judicial bypass proceedings.  Id. at 501-02.  
According to the rule “[w]hen the interest of an infant unborn or unconceived is before the court, 
the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for such interest.”  Id. at 499 n.2 (alteration in original). 
 15. See Brief of Amici Curiae Florida Right to Life, Inc., et. al. at 1, In re Guardianship of 
J.D.S., 864 So. 2d 534 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (No. 5D03-1921).  See also Silverstein, supra 
note 12, at 91-110 (arguing that appointment of guardians in parental consent waiver hearings for 
minors passes constitutional muster under Casey, but that such a conclusion evidences Casey’s 
“serious shortcomings” ). 
 16. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of J.D.S., 864 So. 2d 534, 538 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
 17. See Goldberg, supra note 11, at 544. 
 18. See Renewed Brief of Amici Curiae ACLU, et. al. at 2, In re Guardianship of J.D.S., 864 
So. 2d 534 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (No. 5D03-1921) (arguing that a fetus is not a person within 
the meaning of Florida’s guardianship statutes, and therefore appointment is improper). 
 19. Silverstein, supra note 12, at 89 (quoting pro-life advocate Julian McPhillips). 
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current law.20  It is important to note at the outset that the argument will 
proceed along two distinct lines of analysis, one considering the question when 
abortion is not at issue and the other when abortion is at issue.  This Comment 
will argue that the rights and interests directly attributable to the fetus form the 
primary justification for guardianship appointments in non-abortion contexts, 
and the State interest articulated in Casey forms the primary justification in 
abortion contexts.  In non-abortion contexts, fetal guardians are proper as the 
procedural means by which to protect a fetal right before the court.  These 
normally take the form of 1) a grant by the state of fetal personhood; 2) a legal 
interest in beginning life with sound mind and free from harm; or, more 
indirectly, 3) a state interest in protecting the fetus from harm.  As a procedural 
mechanism, the propriety of a guardian appointment is a distinct question from 
the propriety of the underlying substantive right or interest that it must protect.  
It is legitimized by or derives from either the prior existence of the right or a 
court’s consideration of the right.21  In short, if there is a protectible right or 
interest properly before a court, the State has a parens patriae duty to protect 
that right or interest, and a guardian for the fetus is the appropriate means to do 
so.22 
In abortion contexts, fetal guardians are proper as the means to protect the 
State’s interest in the potential life of the unborn and do not, under current 
federal constitutional jurisprudence, constitute an undue burden on the 
woman’s right to choose abortion.23  The Comment does not contend that 
under current law a fetus can have substantive legal rights that conflict with its 
mother’s right to have an abortion such that increasing fetal rights outside the 
abortion context somehow “overflow” to legitimize guardianships in abortion 
situations.  Instead, the argument will be limited to applying the Casey 
standard to guardianship appointments.  Thus, whether the interest at stake is 
 
 20. I use “maternal-fetal” conflict broadly here to encompass any court proceeding in which 
a mother’s choice (e.g., to use illegal drugs) conflicts with what is arguably in the best interest of 
the fetus (e.g., to be free from beginning life addicted to drugs). 
 21. The interest at stake when the question of a right or legal status is before the court, where 
the State has yet to decide whether to extend the right or status to the fetus, is that the outcome of 
the litigation will either lead to a recognized right or it will not.  Thus, the fetus has a protectible 
future interest in the outcome of the litigation, or, at the very least, the State has an interest in 
seeing that its interest in potential life is fairly represented at the proceeding.  See more detailed 
discussion of this issue infra at 21-24. 
 22. The Comment will argue throughout Part II that the fact of such protectible rights is an 
increasing reality in many states. 
 23. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (stating that the “State has 
legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the 
life of the fetus that may become a child”).  For the record, the author is of the opinion that Roe, 
and by extension Casey insofar as it reaffirms Roe, was wrongly decided and that a fetus should 
have the protected rights of a constitutional person.  However, the Comment argues in Part III 
that notwithstanding this denial of personhood, a fetus deserves the protection of a guardian. 
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imputed to the fetus (in non-abortion contexts) or the State (in abortion 
contexts), the result is a need to protect the interest before the court through 
appointment of a fetal guardian. 
Part I will discuss the theory and purposes of appointing guardians, 
including the source of a court’s authority to appoint guardians and its 
connection to the State’s parens patriae duty.  Part II will give a general 
history of fetal rights law and discuss those rights in cases of prenatal 
substance abuse and forced medical treatment cases generally, as well as in the 
few cases that consider the appointment of guardians.  Part II will also offer 
analysis and conclusions regarding the propriety and appointment of guardians 
in these contexts.  Part III will discuss Casey and subsequent “undue burden” 
jurisprudence, analyze abortion related cases involving appointments of 
guardians for fetuses, and argue that such appointments pass the Casey “undue 
burden” standard.  Parts II and III will also discuss the primary arguments 
offered against appointing guardians. 
I.  A PRELIMINARY MATTER: THE PURPOSE AND FUNCTION OF A GUARDIAN 
While the law governing guardianships historically did not contemplate 
fetuses, the question for the purpose of this Comment is whether the principles 
underlying court-appointed guardians are properly applicable to fetuses in the 
context of their expanding legal rights and in the context of the State’s 
recognized interest in protecting them.  The appointment of guardians for 
minors has its roots in property law.24  Because minors “[were] presumed [to 
be] wanting in discretion to manage their own causes, or to appoint and 
instruct attorneys . . . it [became] the duty of courts, in order to preserve their 
property from destruction or waste, to appoint a guardian to take care of it 
pending the proceedings.”25  The State was seen to have a general right as 
“‘pater patriae’ to interfere in particular cases, for the benefit of such who are 
incapable to protect themselves.”26  This duty of the state continues to exist in 
cases “where a potential conflict exists between the usual decisionmaker and 
the individual whose interests are at stake.”27  In the Twentieth Century, the 
guardian has been described as serving a dual function related to the state and 
to the child.  The first and most “direct” function is in the relation between the 
guardian and his ward.28  The second role is as “trustee of the state’s interests 
 
 24. J. G. WOERNER, A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF GUARDIANSHIP OF MINORS 
AND PERSONS OF UNSOUND MIND 1 (1897). 
 25. Id. at 63.  Another author writing in the mid-1900s said that this duty of the court arises 
because the child is not a juridical person and thus has no standing in court if he sues or is sued 
without a guardian. RICHARD V. MACKAY, GUARDIANSHIP AND THE PROTECTION OF INFANTS 
(LAW FOR THE PARENT AND GUARDIAN) 13 (1948). 
 26. Id. at 2 (quoting Lord Hardwicke, speaking of the High Court of Chancery). 
 27. Goldberg, supra note 11, at 505. 
 28. HASSELTINE BYRD TAYLOR, LAW OF GUARDIAN AND WARD 5 (1935). 
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in the ward” and as such, the guardian is the “actual” protector on behalf of the 
“metaphysical entity” of the state.29 
The type of guardian appointed in a court proceeding is a guardian ad 
litem, “whose duty it is to bring the rights of the infant to the notice of the 
court.”30  The power to appoint such a guardian is “inherent in every court.”31  
Historically, it was the duty of the court to see that the guardian ad litem made 
a proper defense of its ward and did not “surrender the rights” of the ward.32  
The state had an obligation to intervene “when it perceive[d] that a parent has 
acted in a manner that contravenes the state’s protective obligations.”33  Today, 
such protective obligations often arise by statute in situations of suspected 
child abuse or neglect, as well as in response to allegations of medical neglect 
or withholding of medical treatment.34  The question for this Comment is 
whether these traditional rules of guardianship appointments are applicable to a 
fetus, either to protect its own interests or the State’s interests.  Indeed, Susan 
Goldberg has argued that they are not applicable but bases this contention on 
the fact that “[c]urrent legal theories do not accord to the fetus or embryo the 
status and legal protections afforded to children.”35  Contrary to Goldberg’s 
assertion, the law in fact does accord the fetus many legal protections that are 
within constitutional bounds and does recognize a State interest in the fetus.  
As a result, the traditional rules of guardianship appointments are applicable to 
fetuses. 
Prior to examining particular situations in which guardianship 
appointments arise, two objections of general application should be discussed.  
First, a common argument is that, absent a state statute authorizing 
appointment of a guardian for a fetus, a court has no power to make the 
 
 29. Id.  In Taylor’s view, this second function has not been generally recognized, but its 
importance is “fundamental.” Id.  Taylor reasons that the responsibility of the state for all children 
is a long-established responsibility, and that as such, the state must be conscientious in its 
appointment and monitoring of guardians.  Id. 
 30. WOERNER, supra note 24, at 64. 
 31. Id.  A guardian ad litem is “appointed by the court to appear in a lawsuit on behalf of an 
incompetent or minor party.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 713 (7th ed. 1999).  According to 
Susan Goldberg, the role of the guardian ad litem is distinguishable from the role of an advocate.  
“The guardian ad litem represents the best interests of the individual, regardless of the 
individual’s preferences.  An advocate . . . is a proponent of the individual’s point of view.”  
Goldberg, supra note 11, at 505 n.2. 
 32. WOERNER, supra note 24, at 71.  In exercising this protection on behalf of minors, the 
courts did not wish to contravene the rights of parents and normally would only appoint a 
guardian if the parents were dead or declared unfit to have custody of their children.  Id. at 90-91. 
 33. Goldberg, supra note 11, at 507. 
 34. Id. at 508. 
 35. Id. at 504. 
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appointment.36  However, as the brief history above indicates, courts have long 
had an inherent power to appoint guardians absent statutory authority when the 
court identifies a protectible right before it.37  Second, some have argued that a 
guardianship appointment is improper because it “creates” an adversarial 
relationship between the mother and the fetus.38  However, as will be discussed 
in more detail below, it is the substantive right or interest that the guardian is 
charged with protecting that creates an adversarial relationship between mother 
and fetus.  While a court proceeding may involve a guardian “confronting” the 
pregnant mother, such confrontation merely constitutes a necessary function of 
the court in discharging its “rights protecting” duty and does not itself create 
the maternal-fetal conflict.  While one may argue for the impropriety or 
unconstitutionality of the right or State interest that triggers the appointment, 
the cause of the adversity is antecedent to the appointment and functioning of 
the guardian.  Third, many argue that the fetus is not a legal “person” and 
therefore cannot be a “ward.”  The short answer to this objection, which will 
be discussed further below, is that in the limited historical use of guardians for 
fetuses, a guardian has been deemed appropriate so long as the fetus has a 
protectible interest, notwithstanding a lack of legal personhood.39  We now 
turn to an examination of the history and current state of substantive rights 
being granted to fetuses. 
II.  FETAL RIGHTS IN NON-ABORTION CONTEXTS: A GROWING TREND 
A. The Development of Fetal Rights With Respect to Third Parties 
While fetal rights with respect to third parties do not occasion the need for 
a court appointed guardian, the history of these rights is crucial to 
understanding the current extensions of fetal rights.  According to Cynthia 
Daniels, the earliest fetal rights case was Dietrich v. Northampton,40 in which a 
pregnant mother miscarried her four to five month old fetus after a fall 
 
 36. See In re Guardianship of J.D.S., 864 So. 2d 534, 539 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) 
(offering the absence of a provision for fetuses in the state statute governing guardian 
appointments as one of its reasons for refusing to appoint a guardian). 
 37. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.  See also Goldberg, supra note 11, at 506 
(stating that “[c]ourts derive authority to appoint guardians ad litem from statutory provisions, 
procedural rules and their own inherent equity power”). 
 38. See Goldberg, supra note 11, at 528.  In the context of the recent Florida case, the 
executive director of the ACLU of Florida said, “[w]hen you set up a guardian for a fetus, you’re 
creating a situation with the mother and the fetus having competing legal rights.”  Abby 
Goodnough, No Guardian for a Fetus, Court Rules, at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/11/ 
national/11FLOR.html?pagew (Jan. 11, 2004). 
 39. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).  See also, MACKAY, supra note 25, at 13. 
 40. DANIELS, supra note 5, at 10 (citing 138 Mass. 14 (1884)). 
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resulting from a defect in the town highway.41  Oliver Wendell Holmes denied 
the mother damages in tort because the fetus was “part of the mother at the 
time of the injury” and not a person recognized by law as having standing in 
courts.42  This view of the fetus held sway until, in 1887, a state court granted 
fetuses limited rights to inherit property even when the benefactor died prior to 
the birth of the fetus.43 
In 1946, the court in Bonbrest v. Kotz allowed recovery for fetal harm 
caused by a doctor’s negligence during delivery.44  While this case extended 
the rights of a fetus to in utero injuries, the holding was limited to post-
viability injuries, and recovery was contingent upon the subsequent birth of the 
child.45  This post-viability limitation fell in the context of tort law in 1953 
when a New York court held that a child, born alive, may recover for prenatal 
 
 41. Id. at 14-15. 
 42. Id. at 17. 
 43. RACHEL ROTH, MAKING WOMEN PAY: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF FETAL RIGHTS 20 
(2000).  In American law, fetuses have been accorded their most significant and long-standing 
protections in the area of property law.  At common law, a life in being existed from the moment 
of conception and the actual right to inherit was contingent upon live birth.  Goldberg, supra note 
11, at 517.  Goldberg argues that the rationale for this protection was not the legal status of the 
fetus but rather the protection of the presumed intentions of the testator and a limitation on the 
harsh application of the rule against perpetuities.  Id.  See also Dawn Johnsen, From Driving to 
Drugs: Governmental Regulation of Pregnant Women’s Live After Webster, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 
179, 186-87 (1989).  The author stated: 
Legal recognition of the fetus first occurred in narrow, specifically identified contexts 
under tort and probate law to advance specific purposes that do not depend on a particular 
moral view of the fetus’ value and do not create legal conflicts with pregnant women. . . . 
. . . 
. . . [and] were applied solely in ways consistent with and supportive of the interests of 
pregnant women. 
Id. 
 44. 65 F.Supp. 138, 142-43 (D.D.C. 1946). 
 45. The born-alive rule stood for the proposition that unless a child was born alive, the 
ostensible right connected to prenatal injury did not attach or come to fruition.  Aaron Wagner, 
Comment, Texas Two-Step: Serving Up Fetal Rights By Side-Stepping Roe v. Wade has Set the 
Table for Another Showdown on Fetal Personhood in Texas and Beyond, 32 TEX. TECH L. REV. 
1085, 1100 (2001).  The English common law described the rule as follows: 
If a woman be quick with child, and by a potion or otherwise killeth it in her wombe, or if 
a man beat her, whereby the child dyeth in her body, and she is delivered a dead child, 
this is a great misprision, and no murder; but if the child be born and dyeth of the potion, 
battery, or other cause, this is murder; for in the law it is accounted a reasonable creature, 
in rerum natura, when it is born alive. 
Id. (quoting 3 SIR EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES 58 (1648)).  By contrast, a “viability” view holds 
that some level of fetal rights attach when the fetus is capable of independent existence outside 
the womb, whether or not the fetus is subsequently born alive.  Id. at 1102.  Today, most states 
have abandoned the born-alive rule in favor of the theory of viability as the appropriate measure 
for granting the fetus rights.  Id. 
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injury caused by a third party’s negligence at any time at or after conception.46  
While cases like this extended protection to the fetus from conception, the 
born-alive rule created a certain anomaly, namely that a woman whose fetus 
sustained injuries from a beating of the woman could recover damages so long 
as the child was born with those injuries but could recover nothing if the fetus 
died in utero from the injuries.47  This problem led to an increase in advocacy 
for abolition of the born-alive rule and for greater protection for the fetus in 
utero, and, in 1984, Massachusetts affirmed the personhood of a fetus who died 
from injuries in a car accident.48  In the subsequent history of tort law, some 
states have extended full rights of persons to fetuses from conception.  For 
example, in 1995 the Missouri Supreme Court declared that its “legislature 
[had] intended the courts to interpret ‘person’ within [its] wrongful death 
statute to . . . [include] a claim for the wrongful death of [an] unborn child, 
even prior to viability.”49  In 2003, the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that 
the state wrongful death statute included a non-viable fetus who is “quick” in 
the womb.50  As support for the conclusion, the court cited the state’s general 
public and social policy of protecting life.51 
Fetuses have also enjoyed increased protection from third-party harm 
under criminal homicide laws.  The case law and statutes that apply to fetuses 
can be “classified according to whether they accord the fetus no independent 
 
 46. Kelly v. Gregory, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696, 698 (N.Y. 1953).  Other states soon followed suit.  
See, e.g., Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 93 S.E.2d 727 (Ga. 1956); Bennett v. Hymers, 
147 A.2d 108 (N.H. 1958); Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497 (N.J. 1960).  Daniels points out that 
the court’s statement in Brennan that “the child has a legal right to begin life with a sound mind 
and body,” used to affirm the right of the child to sue for third party damages also affirmed the 
more general “right of the child to be protected from negligence or harm in utero.” DANIELS, 
supra note 5, at 12.  This language laid the groundwork for later expansion of fetal rights beyond 
injuries caused by third parties. Id. 
 47. DANIELS, supra note 5, at 14. 
 48. Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1330 (Mass. 1984).  According to Daniels, 
the 1980s was a decade of unprecedented extension of fetal rights as the fetus increasingly came 
to be viewed as a tiny “person” within the body of the pregnant woman.  DANIELS, supra note 5, 
at 9.  This expansion of fetal rights coincided with the technological ability to see the fetus in its 
human form ever earlier in pregnancy, thereby buttressing the argument for distinct legal rights.  
Id. at 10. 
 49. Connor v. Monkem Co., Inc., 898 S.W.2d 89, 92 (Mo. 1995).  See also Strzelczyk v. 
Jett, 870 P.2d 730 (Mont. 1994); Wiersma v. Maple Leaf Farms, 543 N.W.2d 787 (S.D. 1996); 
Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522 (W. Va. Ct. App. 1995).  But see Coveleski v. Bubnis, 634 A.2d 
608, 610 (Pa. 1993) (rejecting a cause of action for wrongful death on behalf of a non-viable 
fetus); LaDu v. Oregon Clinic, P.C., 998 P.2d 733, 738 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) (en banc) (holding 
that a non-viable fetus was not a person under state wrongful death statute). 
 50. 66 Fed. Credit Union v. Tucker, 853 So. 2d 104, 112 (Miss. 2003).  According to the 
court, every jurisdiction in the country as of the date of their decision allowed recovery for 
prenatal injuries when a child is born alive, and six states allowed recovery for a non-viable fetus 
that dies while still in the womb.  Id. at 107. 
 51. Id. at 113. 
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value, some independent value but less than personhood status, or full 
personhood status.”52  According to Americans United For Life, twenty-seven 
states currently treat the killing of a fetus as a form of homicide.53  For 
example, in 1990 the Supreme Court of Minnesota declared constitutional a 
statute designating as first-degree murder the premeditated intentional killing 
of an unborn child.54  In 1994, California’s Supreme Court held that viability 
was not a necessary element of fetal murder, thereby extending its fetal murder 
statute to include any fetus beyond the embryonic stage of development.55  As 
recently as 2003, the Supreme Court of Arkansas denied postconviction relief 
to a defendant convicted under the state’s Fetal Protection Act, which defined a 
person under the state’s homicide statute to include a fetus beyond twelve 
weeks development.56  At the federal level, the Unborn Victims of Violence 
Act was signed into law on April 1, 2004, making it a separate offense under 
federal law to kill an unborn child.57  As states and the federal government 
have extended rights to fetuses vis-à-vis third parties, they have been careful to 
note that the extension does not implicate the constitutional right to an 
abortion.58  However, the question whether states could or would extend rights 
to fetuses when those rights might conflict with the mother in non-abortion 
contexts remained unanswered. 
B. From Third Parties to Mothers 
1. Fetal Rights in Prenatal Substance Abuse Cases 
a. Is there a Fetal Right? 
As the extension of rights to fetuses with respect to harm caused by third 
parties progressed, the states also began to recognize fetal rights vis-à-vis the 
mother.  The seeds of this extension were sown in part by the language of 
earlier tort cases attributing to the fetus a “legal right to begin life with a sound 
mind and body” and by increasingly viewing the fetus as distinct from the 
 
 52. SCHROEDEL, supra note 2, at 13. 
 53. Americans United for Life, States that Prohibit Crimes Against the Unborn, available at 
http://www.unitedforlife.org/guides/fh/fh_statutes.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2004) (providing 
specific statutory references and cases interpreting those references).  According to The Alan 
Guttmacher Institute, there are twenty-nine states in which at least one section of the state’s 
homicide statute includes a fetus as a victim at some point in gestation.  The Alan Guttmacher 
Institute, available at http://www.agi-usa.org/. 
 54. State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318 (Minn. 1990). 
 55. People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591 (Cal. 1994) (en banc). 
 56. Beulah v. State, 101 S.W.3d 802, 804 (Ark. 2003). 
 57. 18 U.S.C. § 1841. 
 58. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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mother.59  “As the language of the law shifted attention from the loss 
experienced by the parent or parents to the loss ‘experienced’ by the fetus” 
efforts increased to protect the fetus from harmful action taken by the mother.60  
This protection came primarily in the form of applying prenatal child abuse 
statutes to the fetus in cases of mothers’ prenatal substance abuse.61  The 1980s 
saw the most significant increase in prosecutions for the use of narcotics by 
pregnant women, but such efforts date back to as early as 1969 when a New 
York trial court held that a mother’s narcotic addiction created a presumption 
of child abuse.62  In 1974, another New York court held that withdrawal 
symptoms in a newborn constituted prima facie evidence of prenatal neglect.63 
Not all jurisdictions followed New York’s lead.  In 1977, a California 
appellate court declined to extend the meaning of the word “child” as used in 
the California Penal Code to protect twin fetuses from their mother’s addiction 
to heroin.64  Three years later, however, a Michigan appellate court held that a 
newborn suffering narcotics withdrawal symptoms as a result of prenatal drug 
abuse may be considered a neglected child within the jurisdiction of the 
probate court.65  Similarly, in 1985 a New York court again declared that “a 
finding that a child is a ‘neglected child’ may be predicated solely upon 
prenatal conduct by the mother” and the unborn child “may be considered a 
person, in order to receive the protection of [the Family Court] act.”66  The 
 
 59. See supra notes 46 and 48 and accompanying text. 
 60. DANIELS, supra note 5, at 15.  In addition to the language of cases such as 
Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324 (Mass. 1984), rapid advances in fetal imaging 
technology and in physicians’ ability to treat fetuses directly as patients contributed to the view 
that fetuses were persons with an existence separate from their mothers.  Id. at 18-19.  Rachel 
Roth, in opposing efforts to create new feticide laws to further punish criminals for harm to 
fetuses, recognizes the inevitable, and in her view unwanted, extension of these rights.  “There is 
no reason to think that the creation of rights for fetuses can be contained in this one realm, 
without potentially adverse effects on women, especially if the laws are not written explicitly to 
exempt pregnant women from their reach.”  ROTH, supra note 43, at 12. 
 61. SCHROEDEL, supra note 2, at 105-109. 
 62. Id. at 49; See also In re John Children, 306 N.Y.S.2d 797 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1969). 
 63. In re Vanessa F., 351 N.Y.S.2d 337, 340 (N.Y. Surrogate Ct. 1974). 
 64. Reyes v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 214, 21-19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (justifying 
holding in part on the fact that other areas of the California criminal code and the Supreme Court 
in Roe had refused to recognize a fetus as a human being or person).  See also In re Steven S. 126 
Cal. App. 3d 23, 29-30 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that a fetus would not be protected under 
child neglect laws); Dittrick Infant v. Dittrick, 263 N.W.2d 37, 39 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) 
(declining to apply the meaning of “child” to a fetus). 
 65. In re Baby X, 293 N.W.2d 736, 739 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980). 
 66. In re Danielle Smith, 492 N.Y.S.2d 331, 332 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1985). The Act’s language, 
as quoted by the court, defined a neglected child as: 
. . . a child less than eighteen years of age 
(i) whose physical, mental or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent 
danger of becoming impaired as a result of the failure of his parent . . . to exercise a 
minimum degree of care 
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court agreed with the contention that Roe v. Wade should not divest “the states 
of the power to grant legal recognition to the unborn in non-14th Amendment 
situations.”67  Using more “state interest” centered reasoning, in 1989 a 
California appellate court held that a petition to protect a newborn child from 
prenatal drug abuse would be upheld because of the State’s significant interest 
in protecting already born babies from the ill-effects of prenatal drug abuse.68  
Thus, at the appellate court level, several states have been willing to grant a 
fetus rights in the face of a mother’s prenatal substance abuse. 
In spite of the number of appellate courts willing to recognize fetal rights 
in this area, no state supreme court was willing to uphold convictions for 
prenatal substance abuse under existing child abuse laws until the South 
Carolina Supreme Court’s 1997 decision in Whitner v. State.69  Taking a 
strongly fetus-centered approach, the court concluded that a fetus is a person 
under the South Carolina Children’s Code by analogizing the case with recent 
South Carolina cases that had recognized a viable fetus as a person under 
wrongful death and criminal statutes.70  Such precedent led the court to say that 
“it would be absurd to recognize the viable fetus as a person for purposes of 
homicide laws and wrongful death statutes but not for purposes of statutes 
proscribing child abuse.”71  The court argued that the protection of fetuses in 
 
(A) in supplying the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter . . . or medical . . . care, 
though financially able to do so or offered financial or other reasonable means to do so; or 
(B) in providing the child with proper supervision or guardianship, . . . by misusing 
alcoholic beverages to the extent that he loses self-control of his actions; or by any other 
acts of a similarly serious nature requiring the aid of the court . . . 
Id. at 333 (alteration in original). 
 67. Id. at 334 (quoting John E.B. Myers, Abuse and Neglect of the Unborn: Can the State 
Intervene? 23 DUQ. L REV. 1, 15 (1984)). 
 68. Troy D. v. Kelly D., 215 Cal. App. 3d 889, 898 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).  See also, In re 
Stefanel Tyesha C., 157 A.D.2d 322, 330-331 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (finding of child neglect 
against a mother for prenatal substance abuse was predicated upon the State’s interest in 
preventing newborn children from the significant ill-effects of prenatal drug abuse and from the 
probability that the mother could not care for the child after birth). 
 69. 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997).  Prior to Whitner, the supreme courts of Florida, Kentucky, 
Nevada, and Ohio had all overturned convictions of women prosecuted under child abuse statutes 
for drug abuse during pregnancy.  SCHROEDEL, supra note 2, at 53. 
 70. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 779-780.  Section 20-7-50 of the Code provides: 
Any person having the legal custody of any child or helpless person, who shall, without 
lawful excuse, refuse or neglect to provide, as defined in § 20-7-490, the proper care and 
attention for such child or helpless person, so that the life, health or comfort of such child 
or helpless person is endangered or is likely to be endangered, shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanor and shall be punished within the discretion of the circuit court. 
Id. at 779 (emphasis omitted). 
 71. Id. at 780.  This language in the court’s opinion extending rights to the fetus by analogy 
from a third-party context to the fetus/mother relationship is, according to abortion advocates, 
simply a step away from proclaiming fetal rights in the abortion context.  For an excellent survey 
of inconsistencies in fetal rights law and a contention that this is precisely the issue facing 
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these areas was justifiable not only “for the sake of its mother or both its 
parents,” but rather because of the State’s interest in the life of a fetus and in 
the protection of the fetus itself.72  In addition, 
It strains belief for Whitner to argue that using crack cocaine during pregnancy 
is encompassed within the constitutionally recognized right of privacy.  Use of 
crack cocaine is illegal, period. . . .  We do not see how the fact of pregnancy 
elevates the use of crack cocaine to the lofty status of a fundamental right.73 
Since Whitner, a New York appellate court has decided a substance abuse 
case using similar reasoning, and South Carolina has reaffirmed Whitner.74  In 
the New York case, the court rejected the argument that a lack of constitutional 
“legal personality” precluded New York from extending legal personality 
under a New York child neglect statute.75  The court noted that New York 
courts have “demonstrated concern and consideration with regard to protecting 
the unborn child or fetus” as reflected in homicide laws, legislative protection 
for the unborn in property disposition and tort law, and the State’s construal of 
a fetus as a medical patient.76  Thus, “surely [the law] may be found to 
encompass protection of the fetus from intentional acts by its mother, which 
acts could cause the child to begin life in an impaired condition.”77 
 
abortion rights advocates see Wagner, supra note 45, at 1123-1125.  “[T]his comment suggests 
for pro-lifers and pro-choicers alike that, if Roe v. Wade is going to fall, it will be through the 
recognition of fetal personhood and the inconsistencies that have come from treating a fetus 
differently under the law depending on the circumstances.”  Id. at 1086. 
 72. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 783. 
 73. Id. at 786.  In reaching its holding the court recognized and distinguished the “many” 
decisions from other state courts that did not allow criminal prosecution under similar state 
statutes but concluded that “both statutory language and case law compel the conclusion we 
reach.”  Id. at 784.  For criticism of the Whitner decision, see Alma Tolliver, Note, Child Abuse 
Statute Expanded to Protect the Viable Fetus: The Abusive Effects of South Carolina’s 
Interpretation of the Word “Child”, 24 S. ILL. U. L.J. 383, 400-03 (2000) (arguing, inter alia, that 
the Whitner court created new law and that the resolution of criminalization of prenatal drug use 
must be left to the legislature); Tara-Nicholle B. DeLouth, Pregnant Drug Addicts as Child 
Abusers: A South Carolina Ruling, 14 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 96, 99-103 (1999) (arguing that 
Whitner raises serious constitutional issues, including violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments as well as a woman’s privacy rights, and raises the public policy concerns of 
selective enforcement and deterring drug addicts from seeking prenatal care). 
 74. In re Unborn Child, 683 N.Y.S.2d 366 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1998); State v. McKnight, 576 
S.E.2d 168 (S.C. 2003).  The case involved a stillborn baby girl whose autopsy revealed cocaine 
in her system.  Id. at 171.  The court in McKnight extended the South Carolina homicide by child 
abuse statute to an unborn child.  Id. at 174. 
 75. Unborn Child, 683 N.Y.S.2d at 368. 
 76. Id. at 368-70. 
 77. Id. at 370. The court went on to find that “[p]rotection of the fetus, when the mother’s 
constitutional privacy right is not involved, is not precluded and is in fact a recognized legitimate 
state interest. In the instant matter, there is no maternal right to privacy involved as it concerns the 
use of illegal drugs.” Id.  Further, with regard to the question of statutory construction: 
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By way of contrast, two state supreme courts since Whitner have declined 
to extend child protection statutes to the fetus.78  In 2003, the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court declined to call a fetus a “child” under the Oklahoma 
Children’s Code and refused to allow the state to take temporary emergency 
custody of the fetus.79  The court rejected an invitation to extend Oklahoma’s 
recognition of the fetus as a “human being” under criminal and wrongful death 
statutes to the Code, and held that “child” applies “only to those who are born, 
living outside the womb of the mother.”80  Also in 2003, the Arkansas 
Supreme Court faced a similar child custody situation in which the State 
argued that a fetus who was in “imminent danger of severe maltreatment and 
was dependent-neglected” due to its mother’s drug use be placed in state 
custody.81  According to the State, the fetus was an individual under the 
Arkansas Juvenile Code, and its mother’s right to privacy was “fairly and 
constitutionally circumscribed” under Arkansas’ constitutional Amendment 68, 
which established a public policy to protect the life of every unborn child.82  
The court rejected this reasoning based on the plain and unambiguous language 
of the statute’s definition of a juvenile as an individual from “birth to age 
eighteen” 83 as well as on the purposes of the Juvenile Code.84 
What conclusions may be drawn as to the rights being afforded fetuses in 
cases of prenatal substance abuse?  There is certainly no settled view among 
the states.  Although most states still have not passed laws making substance 
abuse during pregnancy a separate crime,85 “[b]y 1992 criminal charges had 
been brought against 167 pregnant women for delivering drugs to the fetus 
through the umbilical cord,” and for prenatal child neglect, abuse or 
 
. . . it would be incongruous to imagine the Family Court Act’s clear purpose being 
anything other than to protect children, including unborn children, from harm. . . . 
It is evident that the legislature, as well as other courts and other jurisdictions, 
demonstrates intent to protect the unborn, not only with regard to property rights and tort 
concerns, but with regard to the safety, physical integrity, and overall well being of the 
unborn child. 
Id. at 370, 371. 
 78. In re Unborn Child of Julie Starks, 18 P.3d 342 (Okla. 2001); Arkansas Dept. of Human 
Services v. Collier, 95 S.W.3d 772 (Ark. 2003). 
 79. Unborn Child of Julie Starks, 18 P.3d at 348. 
 80. Id. at 345-46. The court looked to other Oklahoma statutes to conclude that “[w]hen the 
legislature intends to refer to a fetus or to a pregnant woman, it does so specifically.” Id. at 347. 
 81. Collier, 95 S.W.3d at 774. 
 82. Id. at 776. 
 83. Id. at 779. 
 84. Id.  The purposes of the Code included, inter alia, providing “guidance, care, and 
control, preferably in each juvenile’s own home,” “preserv[ing] and strengthen[ing] the juvenile’s 
family ties,” and considering the juvenile’s health and safety when “determining whether or not to 
remove the juvenile from the custody of his or her parents.”  Id. 
 85. SCHROEDEL, supra note 2, at 52–53. 
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manslaughter when the pregnancy ended in the birth of a stillborn baby.86  
Further, “at least thirty-four [states] have prosecuted women for ‘fetal abuse’ 
since 1985” under the same types of statutes.87  According to one institute, as 
of January 1, 2004, thirteen states considered substance abuse during 
pregnancy as child abuse under civil child welfare statutes, and three 
considered it grounds for civil commitment.88  According to Rachel Roth, 
between 1973 and 1992 two-thirds of the states passed legislation specifically 
geared toward women’s drug and alcohol abuse during pregnancy.89  In 
addition, the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in Whitner has been seen by 
some as a tacit delegation of the matter to the states, thereby legitimizing state 
efforts to protect fetuses in this area if they so choose.90  According to 
Schroedel, the Court probably will continue to grant wide latitude to the states 
in extending rights to the fetus without overturning Roe, which will probably 
lead to greater fetal rights in civil law and “enormous disparities in the rights 
accorded the fetus in different states and across policy areas.”91  Thus, some 
states have decided to extend rights to fetuses in this area and efforts to 
prosecute substance-abusing mothers for harm to their fetuses show no signs of 
abating.  Even in states that have not yet granted rights to fetuses, the question 
promises to remain before state courts and legislatures for the foreseeable 
future. 
b. Guardianship Appointments in Prenatal Substance Abuse Cases 
There is very little case law in which the issue of pregnant mothers’ 
substance abuse arises in combination with the issue of a guardianship 
appointment, and in the few cases that mention guardians, there is virtually no 
analysis of the issue.  In a 1988 Ohio appellate case, a pregnant woman 
petitioned the court to issue a writ of prohibition ordering the respondent court 
“to cease the exercise of juvenile court jurisdiction over her in a dependency 
and neglect action.”92  The respondent court appointed a guardian ad litem for 
the unborn child, and the court sustained a motion to intervene filed by the 
 
 86. DANIELS, supra note 5, at 2.  Prosecution under the “delivery of drugs to a minor 
theory,” which argues that the delivery occurs through the umbilical cord in the second after birth 
prior to the cord being cut, has been largely unsuccessful.  James R. Schueller, The Use of 
Cocaine by Pregnant Women: Child Abuse or Choice?, 25 J. LEGIS. 163, 168 (1999). 
 87. SCHROEDEL, supra note 2, at 53. 
 88. Alan Guttmacher Institute, Substance Abuse During Pregnancy, available at 
http://www.agi-usa.org/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2004). 
 89. ROTH, supra note 43, at 163. 
 90. See, e.g., Tolliver, supra note 73, at 403. 
 91. SCHROEDEL, supra note 2, at 167. 
 92. Cox v. Court of Common Pleas, 537 N.E.2d 721, 722 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988). 
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guardian.93  The appellate court made no mention of the propriety or 
impropriety of this appointment. 
In 1997, the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered whether an unborn child 
could be placed in protective custody under the state’s Children’s Code when 
its mother was abusing illegal drugs.94  In concluding on statutory construction 
grounds that a fetus was not a “child” under the Code, the court quoted 
extensively from an exchange at oral argument between the court appointed 
guardian ad litem and one of the appellate justices.  It ultimately decline[d] 
“the guardian ad litem’s invitation to ‘take on this burden’ to fill the legislative 
void” with regard to fetal protection.95 
In 1999, an Ohio appellate court upheld a trial court’s determination that a 
mother’s prenatal cocaine abuse could constitute child abuse when the child 
was born with cocaine in his system.96  The court pointed out that while Roe 
denied personhood to fetuses under the Fourteenth Amendment, it did not 
“eliminate the interest of the State in protecting a viable fetus.”97  In addition, 
the mother argued that the fetus was not a proper ward for the appointment of a 
guardian because the state guardianship statute authorized an appointment for a 
“child” (not a fetus) and also allowed the court to provide emergency medical 
treatment for the child if necessary, which could not logically apply to a 
fetus.98  The court responded by stating “[w]e are not compelled to set 
precedence leaving unprotected similarly drug-exposed infants solely on the 
grounds that portions of the available statutory protections are logistically 
feasible only after the time of birth.”99  In the face of very little instruction 
from the guardianship cases, is it or is it not proper for a court to appoint 
guardians to protect fetal rights in prenatal substance abuse court proceedings? 
c. Guardians for Fetuses? 
Given the lack of a prevailing rule on guardianship appointments, the 
analysis must proceed by considering when, if ever, general rules of 
guardianship appointments are applicable to fetuses.  First, once a state has 
determined by legislation or by court decision that the fetus is a “person” or 
“child,” generally or under a specific child abuse/neglect statute, guardianship 
statutes that mandate appointments for minor children apply equally to fetuses.  
In the absence of a guardianship statute, the court’s parens patriae duty to 
protect a legal person triggers its inherent power to appoint a guardian for that 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. State ex rel. Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 561 N.W.2d 729, 731 (Wis. 1997). 
 95. Id. at 739-740. 
 96. In re Baby Boy Blackshear, No. 99CA00018, 1999 WL 770788, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Sept. 7, 1999). 
 97. Id. at *2. 
 98. Id. at *5. 
 99. Id. 
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purpose.  Susan Goldberg concedes as much, observing that, if in cases where 
the issue of guardianship was not reached but the court granted personhood to 
the fetus, “the case [had] come before the court while the pregnancy was 
ongoing, the court could have appointed a guardian ad litem for the fetus.”100  
It would be incongruous for a state to grant a fetus legal personhood and then 
refuse to offer the protection that status necessitates in a court proceeding.  Of 
course, the objection that granting legal personhood to the fetus even in non-
abortion contexts is a constitutional violation under Roe remains.101  However, 
as several courts have pointed out and as the Supreme Court’s denial of 
certiorari in Whitner indicates, determinations of personhood outside the 
abortion context have been left to the states and are not facially 
unconstitutional when they do not infringe upon a woman’s right to 
abortion.102  Moreover, as Whitner noted, prenatal substance abuse is not a 
constitutionally protected interest.103  Thus, if states are within constitutional 
bounds in extending rights to fetuses in this area, the appointment of a 
guardian to protect those rights is necessarily within constitutional bounds.  
Therefore, in a state such as Missouri, where a general statute grants “human 
being” status to fetuses for the purposes of all laws, as well as in states such as 
South Carolina, where such status has been granted for the purposes of specific 
statutes, any court proceeding involving the fetus that does not implicate the 
right to abortion or some other constitutional right of the mother requires the 
 
 100. Goldberg, supra note 11, at 525. 
 101. Ronald Dworkin, who staunchly supports Roe, suggests that states can protect the life of 
a fetus in a variety of ways—including declarations of personhood—so long as those protections 
do not “curtail [another’s] constitutional rights.”  Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: 
Whether and How Roe Should be Overruled, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 381, 400 (1992).  He writes, “[i]f 
a fetus is not part of the constitutional population, under the national constitutional arrangement, 
then states have no power to overrule that national arrangement by themselves declaring that 
fetuses have rights competitive with the constitutional rights of pregnant women.” Id. at 401.  
Dworkin also suggests that the fetus’s rights deserve greater consideration when the mother’s 
prenatal activity threatens damage that will follow the fetus beyond birth.  “But if a woman 
smokes during pregnancy, someone will later exist whose interests will have been seriously 
damages by her behavior.”  Id. at 405. 
 102. See Parness & Pritchard, supra note 6.  “[T]he [Roe] Court’s position can be summarized 
as treating the unborn not as persons in the whole sense, while recognizing that the unborn can be 
treated as persons in many contexts.”  Id. at 261.  The authors contend that some post-Roe 
decisions incorrectly denied personhood to fetuses in the context of third-party harm to fetuses 
and that “[e]ven some laws prohibiting actions taken by the mother against the unborn are 
presumably unaffected [by Roe], e.g., third trimester abortions or neglect of the unborn where 
abortion is not the mother’s goal.”  Id. at 267. 
 103. See also Schueller, supra note 86, at 175-78.  “While the right to an abortion, post-Roe, 
is a fundamental right, the use of illegal drugs such as cocaine does not rise to the level of a 
protected liberty interest.”  Id. at 176. 
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appointment of a guardian for the fetus in order to protect the fetus’s 
interests.104 
Second, could an appointment be proper when the state has yet to consider 
the issue of the personhood or has already determined that the fetus is not a 
person in general or for purposes of the statute at issue?  The use of guardians 
in cases that have decided against a declaration of legal personhood is an 
instructive place to start.  In the recent Arkansas Supreme Court case that 
decided against protecting a fetus under its Juvenile Code, the court 
nonetheless made significant use of the testimony and findings of a court-
appointed special advocate.105  The trial court based its findings in part on the 
testimony of the child advocate and heard arguments from the advocate that 
the supreme court subsequently relied upon.106  The Wisconsin Supreme Court 
also refused to grant the fetus legal personhood but made similar use of the 
testimony of a court appointed guardian in refusing to protect the fetus.107  Of 
course, the fact that an appellate court relied upon testimony presented at the 
trial court is not notable.  The important point is that neither of these state 
supreme courts noted anything improper about the use of these guardians, even 
though they refused to recognize the fetus as a person. 
The fact that these courts did allow guardian appointments still does not 
answer the question of whether they ought to have allowed them.  The answer 
 
 104. The Missouri statute reads, in pertinent part, as follows: 
1.  The general assembly of this state finds that: 
(1) The life of each human being begins at conception; 
(2) Unborn children have protectable interests in life, health, and well-being; 
. . . 
2. Effective January 1, 1988, the laws of this state shall be interpreted and construed to 
acknowledge on behalf of the unborn child at every stage of development, all the rights, 
privileges, and immunities available to other persons, citizens, and residents of this state, 
subject only to the Constitution of the United States, and decisional interpretations thereof 
by the United States Supreme Court and specific provisions to the contrary in the statutes 
and constitution of this state. . . . 
4. Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as creating a cause of action against a 
woman for indirectly harming her unborn child by failing to properly care for herself or 
by failing to follow any particular program of prenatal care. 
MO. ANN. STAT.  § 1.205. 
The United States Supreme Court in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 
(1989), passed on deciding the constitutionality of the language of the statute, but left much 
power to the state to decide its applicability.  The Court found that “Roe v. Wade ‘implies no 
limitation on the authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over 
abortion.’”  Id. at 506 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)).  “We think the extent to 
which the preamble’s language might be used to interpret other state statutes or regulations is 
something that only the courts of Missouri can definitively decide.”  Id. 
 105. Arkansas Dept. of Human Services v. Collier, 95 S.W.3d 772, 773 (Ark. 2003).  The 
court also referred to her as a “child advocate representative.”  Id. at 775. 
 106. Id. at 773, 775. 
 107. State ex rel. Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 561 N.W.2d 729, 739-40. (Wis. 1997). 
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to this question is found in the fact that the limited historical use of court-
appointed guardians for fetuses did not depend upon the legal personhood of 
the ward, but rather on the existence of a fetus’s legal interest before the court.  
Well before the idea of assigning fetuses legal personhood, Blackstone saw 
that appointing a guardian was appropriate to protect the interests of a fetus. 
Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature in every 
individual; and it begins in contemplation of law as soon as an infant is able to 
stir in the mother’s womb. . . 
An infant in ventre sa mere, or in the mother’s womb, is supposed in law to be 
born for many purposes. It is capable of having a legacy, or a surrender of a 
copyhold estate, made to it. It may have a guardian assigned to it; and it is 
enabled to have an estate limited to its use, and to take afterwards by such 
limitation, as if it were then actually born. And in this point the civil law 
agrees with ours.108 
Moreover, one historian has noted that the absence of juridical personhood is 
actually one of the reasons in favor of appointing a guardian because without a 
guardian the legal non-person has no means of protecting its legal interests.109  
The Roe Court also noted the use of guardians ad litem in property proceedings 
well before legal personhood had been extended to fetuses in any area of 
law.110  The argument is not that, because the fetus has enjoyed a substantive 
property interest in the past, it should now enjoy substantive rights against its 
mother based on an analogy of those rights to property rights.  Rather, 
notwithstanding a refusal to extend legal personhood to fetuses, courts have 
recognized that a fetus can have legally significant interests.  Given the 
possibility that a court proceeding will affect those interests, it is incumbent 
upon the court to protect them.111  Such rights are sometimes referred to as the 
rights of a “future person” that include a “right to begin life with a sound mind 
 
 108. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 117-18 (emphasis added). 
 109. MACKAY, supra note 25, at 13. 
 110. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973). 
 111. The important distinction between the fetal property interest and an interest in protection 
from prenatal substance abuse is that the former does not conflict with any right of the mother and 
the latter potentially does.  However, as Whitner noted, though the protection of the fetus in these 
cases creates a conflict, it does not create a constitutionally impermissible conflict because there 
is no constitutional right to use illegal substances.  Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 786 (S.C. 
1997).  In any case, see the following textual paragraph for my argument that the guardian cannot 
properly be considered the cause of any constitutional conflict even if one does exist. 
  It is also true that one purpose of the recognition of these property rights was to protect 
the wishes of the benefactor who had died. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.  However, 
again, regardless of the justification, the point in using the property example here is not to 
compare the substantive rights, but simply to show that the protective function of a guardian does 
not depend upon the full legal personhood of its ward. 
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and body, and the right not to be harmed.”112  As an alternative justification, 
the appointment of a guardian ad litem vindicates the state’s substantial interest 
in the outcome of cases involving the significant social problem of drug-
addicted babies.  Some courts have been explicit in using this state interest 
rationale to justify extending certain statutes to protect fetuses.113  A guardian 
for the fetus plays a vital role in protecting this interest by presenting evidence, 
making arguments, and assuring a full hearing on the issue at hand.114  
Therefore, the presence of the fetus’s protectible future interest and the State’s 
interest in the problem of prenatal drug abuse both justify the appointment of a 
guardian, whether or not the state has recognized the fetus as a legal person. 
Third, even if there is a protectable interest before the court, Goldberg 
argues that the appointment of the guardian itself is an unconstitutional 
invasion of privacy as it “would force a woman to justify her conduct to 
another individual, potentially compelling her to divulge intimate and private 
details of her life.”115  She argues that the State interest in a fetus as part of the 
anatomy of the pregnant woman does not justify such an intrusion into the 
personal physical autonomy and privacy rights of a mother.116  The problem 
with Goldberg’s argument is that its proper target is the underlying substantive 
right that the fetus has been given or the interest that the court is considering 
rather than the guardian appointment.  Concluding that the guardian is the 
cause of these intrusions is to assign to the guardian a power it does not have.  
If there is a problem of intrusion, the problem is with the substantive law that 
gives rise to the court proceeding in the first place and dictates the extent to 
which the court must delve into the pregnant mother’s privacy in order to 
follow and correctly apply the law.  If the substantive law is not 
unconstitutional, then the role of the guardian as an officer of the court is not, 
in itself, an unconstitutional violation of privacy.117 
Finally, Goldberg raises the concern that because a guardian cannot 
possibly ascertain the “best interests” of a fetus, the guardian’s advocacy will 
be based on “subjective notions of what constitutes appropriate behavior.”118  
She asserts “[i]t would be extremely difficult at best for the guardian to 
 
 112. DEBORAH MATHIEU, PREVENTING PRENATAL HARM: SHOULD THE STATE INTERVENE? 
38-39 (2d ed. 1996); see also supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing early tort case 
language affirming the right of in utero protection for the unborn child). 
 113. See, e.g.,  In re Danielle Smith, 492 N.Y.S.2d 331 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1985). 
 114. Cases involving a mother’s substance abuse not only involve the issue of convicting the 
mother of abuse or neglect, but often involve the question of termination of parental rights upon 
birth.  Such a determination will always be particularly fact intensive and require the court to take 
into account many factors in determining whether to terminate parental rights. 
 115. Goldberg, supra note 11, at 534. 
 116. Id. at 533. 
 117. Even the courts that have refused to allow the terms “child” or “person” to extend to 
fetuses have done so on statutory construction grounds rather than constitutional grounds. 
 118. Goldberg, supra note 11, at 535. 
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ascertain what the ‘best interests’ of the fetus . . . would be in these 
circumstances.”119  If this argument succeeds in defeating guardianship 
appointments for fetuses, it would also defeat guardianship appointments for 
incompetent adults who have not, prior to their incompetence, made known 
their wishes.  A guardian’s job is to ascertain, based on all the available 
evidence, what the best interests of its ward are.  That this function may pose a 
significant challenge is hardly reason to deny the appointment in the first place.  
For these reasons, the appointment of a guardian ad litem in court proceedings 
involving a mother’s prenatal substance abuse is a proper and necessary 
function of the court’s duty to protect the interests and rights before it. 
2. Fetal Rights In Medical Treatment Cases 
a. Is There a Fetal Right? 
A second area of non-abortion related fetal rights is the medical treatment 
of mothers for the sake of their fetuses.  Physicians and hospitals “increasingly 
resort” to the courts in order to compel treatment of pregnant women for this 
purpose.120  Between 1973 and 1992, courts in twenty-five states granted court 
orders to force pregnant women to undergo medical procedures for the benefit 
of the fetus.121  Hospitals often petition courts for the orders, due in large part 
to the medical establishment’s increasing imputation of medical “personality” 
to the fetus itself, which engenders a “second patient” approach to treating the 
fetus.122  This approach creates a balancing of rights between the fetus and the 
mother when the fetus is in need of medical treatment.123 
A number of cases considering this issue also discuss guardianship 
appointments.  The following overview of the case law will include both cases 
that discuss fetal rights but do not consider guardianships and those that 
discuss those rights along with guardianship appointments in medical treatment 
situations.  The issue came before the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1964 
when a Jehovah’s Witness refused blood transfusions for religious reasons.124  
 
 119. Id. at 536. 
 120. April L. Cherry, The Free Exercise Rights of Pregnant Women Who Refuse Medical 
Treatment, 69 TENN. L. REV. 563, 564 (2002).  According to Rachel Roth, one California 
obstetrician claims that he obtained forty-nine out of the fifty court orders he sought for cesarean 
section surgeries for non-consenting pregnant women which, if accurate, exceeds all published 
accounts of forced cesareans in law and medical journals.  ROTH, supra note 43, at 95. 
 121. ROTH, supra note 43, at 95. 
 122. Id. at 105. 
 123. Id. at 106.  Some argue that such an approach is improper because it ignores women’s 
free exercise of religion rights (in cases involving refusal on religious grounds) and/or ignores a 
woman’s constitutional right to refuse medical treatment. See Cherry, supra note 120, at 588-93. 
 124. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem’l Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537, 537-38 (N.J. 
1964). 
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The plaintiff hospital sought authority to give the transfusions, if they should 
be necessary to save the life of the mother or her unborn, quick child.125  The 
New Jersey Supreme Court granted the hospital’s request because it was 
“satisfied that the unborn child is entitled to the law’s protection” and 
remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to appoint a special 
guardian for the unborn child.126  In 1981, a hospital petitioned a Georgia court 
to allow its physicians to perform a cesarean section and administer blood 
transfusions to save the life of an unborn viable child and the mother.127  The 
court concluded that the unborn child had a legal right to the court’s protection 
and authorized the hospital to administer “all medical procedures deemed 
necessary by the attending physician to preserve the life of [the] defendant’s 
unborn child.”128  A day later the Georgia Department of Human Resources 
petitioned the juvenile court for temporary custody of the unborn child, at 
which point the court appointed counsel for the parents and the unborn child—
to represent “the interests of the unborn child.”129  The court granted temporary 
custody to the Georgia Department of Human Resources, giving it authority to 
make all decisions pertaining to the birth of the child.  It did so on the grounds 
that the intrusion into the life of the mother was outweighed by the “duty of the 
State to protect a living, unborn human being from meeting his or her death 
before being given the opportunity to live.”130 
 
 125. Id.  Doctors believed there was a “probability” that the mother would hemorrhage 
severely at some point during the pregnancy, which would lead to the death of both her and the 
fetus.  Id. at 538. 
 126. Id. The case did not offer any analysis of this appointment. 
 127. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457, 458 (Ga. 1981) (per 
curiam). The examining physician found that there was a 99% certainty that the child would not 
survive a vaginal delivery, a 50% chance that the mother would not survive, and that both would 
have an almost 100% chance of survival with a cesarean section.  Id. 
 128. Id.  The court also noted that an abortion of a viable fetus would be a criminal offense in 
Georgia, and that, under Roe, a viable child has the right to the protection of the State.  Id. 
 129. Id. at 459.  As is common in many fetal representation cases as well as in cases involving 
questions of fetal rights generally, the court used both a State’s interest rationale for protecting 
the unborn child’s rights and a seemingly distinct fetal rights language to justify appointing 
representation for the fetus.  Id. 
 130. Id. at 460. A fuller excerpt from the court’s order is as follows: 
. . . Should said sonogram indicate to the attending physician that the complete placenta 
privia is still blocking the child’s passage into this world, Jessie Mae Jefferson, is Ordered 
to submit to a Caesarean section and related procedures considered necessary by the 
attending physician to sustain the life of this child. 
The Court finds that the State has an interest in the life of this unborn, living human 
being. The Court finds that the intrusion involved into the life of Jessie Mae Jefferson and 
her husband, John W. Jefferson, is outweighed by the duty of the State to protect a living, 
unborn human being from meeting his or her death before being given the opportunity to 
live.  Id. 
In a concurrence, one of the justices pointed out that the power of the court to order a competent 
adult to submit to surgery is “exceedingly limited” but that in this instance, the unborn child’s 
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In 1985, a New York court, faced with a pregnant woman in imminent 
danger of death who had refused blood transfusions on religious grounds, held 
that the hospital could give her the transfusions over her objection.131  The 
court noted that it would not interfere if the woman’s life were the only one 
involved, but that it “must consider the life of the unborn fetus.”132  The court 
noted that though the fetus was not viable, in a non-abortion context the state 
“has a highly significant interest in protecting the life of a mid-term fetus, 
which outweighs the patient’s right to refuse a blood transfusion on religious 
grounds” and, therefore, “the fetus can be regarded as a human being, to whom 
the court stands in parens patriae, and whom the court has an obligation to 
protect.”133 
In 1999, a United States District Court in Florida upheld a state court’s 
order compelling a pregnant woman to submit to a cesarean section.134  The 
court recognized the important constitutional interests at stake,135 but asserted 
that because of the risk to the fetus, “the scope of Ms. Pemberton’s personal 
constitutional rights in this situation . . . clearly did not outweigh the interests 
of the State of Florida in preserving the life of the unborn child.”136  Thus, the 
order compelling the cesarean section was proper. 
By contrast, other courts have refused to hold that a fetus’s rights outweigh 
a mother’s right to refuse medical treatment.  In 1983 the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts reversed a trial court ruling compelling a pregnant 
woman to have a surgical procedure to prevent a miscarriage.137  The court left 
open the possibility that in certain instances the State interest might be 
sufficient to justify such an intrusion for the benefit of the child but concluded 
that the record in the case at bar did not show “circumstances so compelling as 
 
right to live outweighed the right of the mother to refuse the surgery.  Id. (Hill, J., concurring).  In 
a separate concurrence, another justice highlighted the fact that there was “no less burdensome 
alternative for preserving the life of [the] fully developed fetus than requiring [the] surgery,” 
because the risk to the fetus and the mother would be minimal as compared to the almost certain 
death of the fetus and significant risk to the mother if the surgery was not performed. Id. at 461 
(Smith, J., concurring). 
 131. In re Application of Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y.S.2d 898, 900 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).  See 
also Crouse Irving Mem’l Hosp., Inc., v. Paddock 485 N.Y.S.2d 443, 446 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) 
(holding that the hospital and attending physicians were entitled to give blood transfusions to 
baby and mother subsequent to the baby’s birth over mother’s religious objections). 
 132. Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y.S.2d. at 899. 
 133. Id. at 900. 
 134. Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem’l Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 66 F. Supp.2d 1247 (N.D. Fla. 
1999). 
 135. Id. at 1251.  Ms. Pemberton asserted violations of her “right to bodily integrity, [ ] right 
to refuse unwanted medical treatment, and a right to make important personal [ ] decisions 
regarding the bearing of children without undue governmental interference.”  Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Taft v. Taft, 446 N.E.2d 395, 397 (Mass. 1983). The procedure involved suturing the 
cervix so that it would “hold” the pregnancy.  Id. at 396. 
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to justify curtailing the wife’s constitutional rights.”138  The trial court had 
appointed a guardian ad litem for the fetus, but beyond mentioning the fact, the 
court did not indicate its view of the propriety of the appointment.139 
In 1990, the Court of Appeals of New York rejected a hospital’s 
application for an order authorizing blood transfusions over the objections of a 
woman who had just given birth by cesarean section.140  The court held that 
there was no countervailing interest to outweigh the right of a competent adult 
“to determine the course of [his or] her own [medical] treatment.”141  However, 
the court noted that an identified state interest may be sufficient to override this 
right and, in the appropriate case, the courts must weigh “the interests of the 
individual against the interest asserted on behalf of the State to strike an 
appropriate balance.”142  Also in 1990, the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals held that “in virtually all cases [involving a pregnant mother’s 
decision to receive medical treatment] the question of what is to be done is to 
be decided by the patient—the pregnant woman—on behalf of herself and the 
fetus.”143  The case involved a pregnant woman, A.C., who was near death 
with cancer, and her twenty-six week old fetus.  The lower court ordered a 
cesarean section delivery, but shortly thereafter both the baby and mother 
died.144  The court rested its decision to reverse the lower court on its inability 
to tell from the record whether A.C. was competent to make the decision to 
allow the cesarean section.145 
We have no reason to believe that, if competent, A.C. would or would not have 
refused consent to a cesarean.  We hold, however, that without a competent 
refusal . . . it was error for the trial court to proceed to a balancing analysis, 
weighing the rights of A.C. against the interests of the state.146 
In 1994, an Illinois appellate court denied a petition to force a competent 
pregnant woman to undergo a cesarean section for the benefit of her fetus but 
 
 138. Id. at 397.  More specifically, there were: 
no findings, based on expert testimony, describing the operative procedure, stating the 
nature of any risks to the wife and to the unborn child, or setting forth whether the 
operation is merely desirable or is believed to be necessary as a life-saving procedure.  
We have no showing of the degree of likelihood that the pregnancy will be carried to term 
without the operation. 
Id. 
 139. Id. at 395-96. 
 140. Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77 (N.Y. 1990). 
 141. Id. at 84. 
 142. Id. at 81. 
 143. In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1237 (D.C. 1990). 
 144. Id. at 1241. 
 145. Id. at 1247. 
 146. Id.  The court also noted that overriding a woman’s objection to medical treatment poses 
the problem of “driv[ing] women at high risk of complications during pregnancy and childbirth 
out of the health care system to avoid coerced treatment.”  Id. at 1248. 
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did not comment on the fact that the juvenile court below had appointed a 
guardian.147  In so holding, the appellate court concluded that Illinois courts 
should not engage in a balancing of the rights of the viable fetus and the rights 
of a competent woman to refuse medical care.148  A woman’s choice to refuse 
such invasive surgery “must be honored, even in circumstances where the 
choice may be harmful to her fetus”149 and “[t]he potential impact upon the 
fetus is not legally relevant.”150  The court indicated the possibility that 
relatively non-invasive and risk-free procedures might require a different 
conclusion, but it did not rule on that issue.151 
Finally, three years later, an Illinois appellate court faced the question of 
whether the State’s interest in the potential life of a fetus (as opposed to the 
interests of the fetus itself) may be weighed against the woman’s decision to 
refuse medical treatment.152  The medical situation involved a pregnant 
woman’s seriously low hemoglobin levels that, in one doctor’s opinion, put the 
woman and her fetus’s chances of survival at five percent if not corrected by a 
blood transfusion.153  The court “appoint[ed] the public guardian of Cook 
County, over his [own] objection, to represent the fetus.”154  After “balancing 
the mother’s right to refuse medical treatment against the State’s substantial 
interest in the viable fetus,” the court held that on the facts of this case “the 
State may not override a pregnant woman’s competent treatment decision, 
 
 147. In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, 335 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). 
 148. Id. at 330. 
 149. Id.  The court based its decision on the general right of every competent individual to 
refuse medical treatment under Illinois common law, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and under the religious liberty protection of both the Illinois and U.S. constitutions.  
Id. at 330-331. 
 150. Id. at 332. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied heavily on a 1988 Illinois 
Supreme Court decision dealing with unintentional infliction of prenatal injuries in which “the 
court strongly suggested that there can be no consistent and objective legal standard by which to 
judge a woman’s actions during pregnancy” and in which the court “explicitly rejected the view 
that the woman’s rights can be subordinated to fetal rights.” Id. (citing Stallman v. Youngquist, 
531 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. 1988)). 
 151. Id. at 333.  In addition, the court rejected the argument that such a situation was 
analogous to the state’s ability under Roe to proscribe abortion due to its compelling interest in 
the potential life of a viable fetus.  It reasoned, “[t]he fact that the state may prohibit post-viability 
pregnancy terminations does not translate into the proposition that the state may intrude upon the 
woman’s right to remain free from unwanted physical invasion of her person when she chooses to 
carry her pregnancy to term.”  Id. at 334. 
 152. In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397, 398 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). 
 153. Id. at 399. 
 154. Id.  The trial court subsequently appointed the hospital administrator as temporary 
custodian of the fetus, with the right to consent to blood transfusions for the mother upon the 
advice of a physician. Id. at 400.  Darlene Brown, the mother, was given six units of blood over 
the course of two days.  When she resisted the transfusion, she was forced to comply with the 
decision of the temporary custodian.  Id. 
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including refusal of recommended invasive medical procedures, to potentially 
save the life of the viable fetus.”155  The court then distinguished this proper 
balancing of the State’s interest in potential life and the mother’s rights from a 
balancing of the ostensible rights of the fetus and the mother’s rights, which 
would be improper.156  Because the case involved the mother’s rights vis-à-vis 
the State’s interest, rather than the fetus’s rights, the “asserted legal interests 
did not require” a guardian to be appointed for the fetus, and the circuit court 
had, therefore, erred in the appointment.157 
b. Guardians for Fetuses? 
Probably more so than with prenatal substance abuse, the court decisions 
on forced medical treatment indicate no clear trend regarding the extent that 
courts will recognize a fetal interest and no clear view on the appointment of 
guardians.  There has been much criticism of forced medical treatment, and 
some writers see medical intervention for the sake of the fetus as “subjugation 
of one human being to another.”158  Rachel Roth opposes the practice in part 
because many situations involve doctors and hospitals in effect railroading 
courts into approving emergency medical procedures that are not truly 
necessary for the health of mother or fetus.159  Roth’s objection to coercive 
tactics has merit, and the extent to which Roth is right at least raises questions 
with regard to how such decisions are reached and executed. 
With regard to whether there is a fetal right to be balanced against the 
mother’s right, and hence one deserving of a guardian’s protection, at least 
three things are clear even in the midst of the disparate court decisions.  First, 
all courts recognize that a competent adult has a significant right to refuse 
medical treatment.  Second, all courts acknowledge that this right is qualified 
rather than absolute and must at times give way to other interests—sometimes 
described as the State’s interest and sometimes described as the fetus’s interest.  
Third, all courts acknowledge, explicitly or implicitly, that this determination 
requires a careful factual inquiry as to the medical situation involved, the 
seriousness of the proposed procedure, and the risks of the procedure to the 
health of the mother and the fetus in order to reach a conclusion as to which 
interest(s) outweighs the other.160  Each case discussed above embraced a 
 
 155. Id. at 405. 
 156. Id. at 406. 
 157. In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d at 406. 
 158. Cheryl E. Amana, Maternal-Fetal Conflict: A Call For Humanism and Consciousness In 
a Time of Crisis, 3 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 351, 369 (1992). 
 159. ROTH, supra note 43, at 89-107.  Here Roth presents persuasive evidence that sometimes 
these cases do involve coercion.  Id. 
 160. Even cases that do not consider the fetus’s rights “legally relevant” allow for balancing 
between the State’s interest and the mother’s interest (albeit with some indication that a State’s 
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balancing of competing interests as the appropriate analytical approach to 
resolution of the issue of forced medical treatment.  As with prenatal substance 
abuse, opposition to or support of medical treatment for the benefit of fetuses 
does not change this balancing and the procedural process that accompanies it.  
It is the fact of the balancing itself that weighs in favor of the appointment of a 
guardian for the fetus, whether the interests being balanced are attributable to 
the fetus or to the State. 
When the interest at stake is described as the State’s rather than the fetus’s, 
the functional capacity of the guardian is the same as if the interest were 
granted to the fetus. While a guardian is most often directly protective of the 
rights of the ward, a second recognized function of a guardian is to protect the 
interest of the state.161  Thus, In re Fetus Brown’s conclusion that a guardian 
was inappropriate because the State’s “asserted legal interests did not require” 
the appointment is incorrect.162  As I will argue in more detail below in Section 
III.C, because protection of the State’s interest in such proceedings is 
dependent on some form of direct protection of the fetus itself, the fetal 
guardian as the protector of the State’s interest is, at least in a formal sense, an 
appropriate role.  Therefore, even in those jurisdictions, such as Illinois, that 
regard a balancing of fetal rights and a mother’s rights as improper, a State 
interest triggers the balancing of interests that requires the protection of a 
guardian. 
Finally, the arguments advanced in Section I.B(1)(c) in favor of fetal 
guardians in prenatal substance abuse cases, even in the absence of a state 
declaration of fetal personhood and in the absence of statutory authorization of 
the appointment, apply equally to the medical treatment cases.  The argument 
advanced in the same section distinguishing the propriety of the guardianship 
appointment from the antecedent question of the propriety of the underlying 
interest applies here as well.  In non-abortion related court proceedings, when a 
fetus’s interests are before the court, the appointment of a guardian is the 
necessary and proper mechanism for the protection of those interests. 
III.  ABORTION 
Because states cannot, under current law, extend legal personhood and its 
attendant rights and interests to the fetus when a mother’s right to abortion is at 
stake, a guardianship appointment in such cases cannot be justified by the need 
for protection of substantive rights and interests of the fetus.  This section will 
discuss the appropriate basis for defending guardianship appointments in 
certain abortion-related court proceedings. 
 
interest can rarely outweigh the mother’s).  In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, 332 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1994). 
 161. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 162. In re Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397, 406 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). 
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A. Pre-Roe v. Wade 
Throughout the history of the abortion question, the issue of fetal 
“personhood” has been important to varying degrees.  Early Western 
philosophers and theologians debated the exact time of “ensoulment”—the 
moment when a person’s soul entered the body—in order to establish a marker 
for when a fetus obtained the status of a human being, and later considered 
“quickening”—when movement in the womb is detectable—as the proper 
demarcation.163  Far from being academic considerations, such moral beliefs 
had a significant impact on British common law and later on American 
abortion law.164  From the early colonial period to the mid-twentieth century, 
American laws generally prohibited abortion.  It was not until efforts in the 
mid-twentieth century to reform and liberalize abortion laws that there was a 
widespread focus in America on the fetus as a distinct life as the justification 
for opposing abortion.165  A 1962 case involving the efforts of Sherrie 
Finkbine, a popular television host, to obtain an abortion pushed the question 
of fetal personhood into the public consciousness and became a flashpoint 
between those in favor of abortion reform and those opposed.166  “‘The 
fundamental disagreement about whether or not an embryo represented a ‘real’ 
person or merely a potential person, a disagreement that had existed beneath 
the surface for at least a hundred years, was finally forced into the open by the 
Finkbine case.”167  For the next decade efforts at loosening abortion 
restrictions met with some success through legislative means.168  Soon 
thereafter, the pro-choice movement turned its attention to challenging the 
constitutionality of abortion bans in the courts, culminating in the 7-2 decision 
 
 163. SCHROEDEL, supra note 2, at 17.  For example, Pythagoras and Hippocrates opposed 
abortion at any point during pregnancy based upon the belief that the soul formed at conception.  
Id.  By contrast, Aristotle thought that ensoulment did not occur until the “animal” phase of 
human development which occurred forty days after conception for males and eighty days after 
conception for females.  Thus, Aristotle supported abortion only before ensoulment had occurred.  
Id. at 17-18.  Plato went even further in his support of abortion and suggested that the State could 
demand abortion for women over forty years old.  Id. at 18. 
 164. Id. at 20.  During the mid-seventeenth century, postquickening abortion was a crime in 
all the colonies, and some localities had laws making it difficult to obtain abortion at any stage of 
pregnancy.  Id. 
 165. Id. at 38.  The term “right to life” was used as early as 1963.  Id.  For a helpful, more 
detailed look at the historical development of abortion law through Roe, see id. at 16-40. 
 166. Id. at 37.  The situation involved the host’s ingestion of an anti-nausea drug, 
thalidomide, that was found a couple of months later to be the cause of severe birth defects 
around the world.  A hospital scheduled an abortion, only to cancel it at the last minute because of 
the negative publicity it had received.  Id. 
 167. Id. (quoting KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 80 
(1984)). 
 168. SCHROEDEL, supra note 2, at 38.  For example, by 1970 four states had repealed their 
abortion bans and legalized abortion. Id. 
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in Roe v. Wade overturning and declaring unconstitutional a Texas ban on 
abortion.169  Roe, of course, decided the personhood question in the negative, 
but it did so in a way that began the legal wrangling over what protection, if 
any, the state may exercise on behalf of the fetus in the face of the mother’s 
right to abortion.170 
B. Roe and Casey 
1.  Roe v. Wade 
Even as it granted the abortion right to women, for the purposes of this 
Comment, Roe is most significant for the way in which it qualified and placed 
certain limitations upon abortion as well.  The Court reasoned that a person’s 
right to personal liberty “is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision 
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy” but rejected the argument that such 
a right “is absolute and that she is entitled to terminate her pregnancy at 
whatever time, in whatever way, and for whatever reason she alone 
chooses.”171  Thus, the right of personal privacy, which includes abortion, is a 
qualified right that “must be considered against important state interests in its 
regulation . . . . and . . . at some point the state interests as to protection of 
health, medical standards, and prenatal life, become dominant.”172  In 
balancing these interests, the Court explained the point at which the State has a 
compelling interest in fetal life as follows: 
With respect to the State’s important and legitimate interest in potential life, 
the ‘compelling’ point is at viability.  This is so because the fetus then 
presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb.  
State regulation protective of fetal life after viability thus has both logical and 
biological justifications.  If the State is interested in protecting fetal life after 
 
 169. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 170. SCHROEDEL, supra note 2, at 44-45. 
 171. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. 
 172. Id. at 154-55.  The reason that the Court could speak of such a balancing was that it 
rejected the argument that a fetus is a person under the Fourteenth Amendment with a guaranteed 
right to life.  Id. at 157-58.  While this Comment will argue that guardianships ought to be 
allowed in certain abortion contexts notwithstanding this determination of personhood, it is 
interesting to note that much of the opposition to the recognition of fetal rights in non-abortion 
areas of the law is based upon the Roe Court’s assertion that “[i]f this suggestion of personhood is 
established, the appellant’s case, of course, collapses.” Id. at 156-57.  Abortion advocates 
recognize that expansion of personhood to fetuses in non-abortion contexts makes it difficult to 
ignore the question of personhood in the abortion context, and some have argued, following Roe’s 
lead, that the future of abortion rights hinges on the question of personhood.  See, e.g., Wagner, 
supra note 45.  In the context of guardianships for fetuses, the ACLU recently has argued in a 
brief that a guardian for a fetus should not be allowed because of this lack of personhood. 
Renewed Brief of Amici Curiae ACLU et. al. at 5-11, In re J.D.S., 864 So. 2d 534 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2004) (5D03-1921). 
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viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period, except 
when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.173 
The Court concluded its analysis by stating that its holding “is consistent with 
the relative weights of the respective interests involved” and “leaves the State 
free to place increasing restrictions on abortion as the period of pregnancy 
lengthens, so long as those restrictions are tailored to the recognized state 
interests.”174  Thus, the Roe decision, while firmly entrenching the right of a 
woman to choose abortion, affirmed the State’s right to regulate the decision at 
certain points of the pregnancy.  As Schroedel notes, in the abortion arena, Roe 
began the balancing act between the woman and the fetus.175 
2. Planned Parenthood v. Casey 
Nearly 20 years after Roe, Planned Parenthood v. Casey considered the 
constitutionality of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, as 
amended in 1988 and 1989.176  The Court began its opinion by reaffirming the 
three parts of the essential holding of Roe,177 reaffirming Roe’s placement of 
the abortion decision within a woman’s fundamental individual liberty 
interest,178 and justifying its affirmation in part on the importance of stare 
 
 173. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64. 
 174. Id. at 165.  Schroedel calls the decision “an uneasy compromise between competing 
rights” that “presented the Court with the problem of balancing one value . . . against another.” 
SCHROEDEL, supra note 2, at 42.  She goes on to say that this balancing of interests: 
changed the conception of maternal-fetal relations.  Until Roe, the legal system supported 
the biological unity of woman and fetus and viewed their interests as identical.  Even 
when courts had found some degree of legal personhood in the fetus . . . they had assumed 
that the interests of the woman and fetus at least coincided. In Roe, however, the Court’s 
trimester framework established a precedent that viewed the interests of mother and fetus 
as adversarial. 
Id. at 44. 
 175. SCHROEDEL, supra note 2, at 44-45. 
 176. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).  For a recent and unequivocal 
criticism of the decision, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of All 
Time, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 995 (2003).  Paulsen argues that “[i]f the human embryo . . . is 
morally entitled to be treated as a human being . . . then the regime created in Roe and 
dramatically reaffirmed in Casey creates an essentially unrestricted substantive legal right of 
some human beings to kill . . . other human beings.  Id. at 996-97. 
 177. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.  As stated by the Casey Court, those parts are: (1) a woman has a 
“right to choose to have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interference 
from the State. Before viability, the State’s interests are not strong enough to support a 
prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle to the woman’s effective right 
to elect [abortion]”; (2) the State has power to restrict abortion after viability, “if the law contains 
exceptions for pregnancies which endanger the woman’s life or health”; (3) “[T]he State has 
legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the 
life of the fetus that may become a child.” Id. 
 178. Id. at 846-53. 
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decisis.179  However, in affirming Roe, the Court also acknowledged that some 
of Roe’s “factual assumptions” involving the “scheme of time limits on the 
realization of competing interests” were no longer valid.180  One of the most 
significant changes wrought by Casey was its emphasis on and articulation of 
the “important and legitimate” State interest in potential life prior to viability.  
The Court began by asserting that, even in the earliest stages of pregnancy, the 
State may adopt rules “designed to encourage [the mother] to know that there 
are philosophic and social arguments of great weight that can be brought to 
bear in favor of continuing the pregnancy to full term” as well as rules 
requiring full divulgence of information about adoption options.181  Thus, 
“measures aimed at ensuring that a woman’s choice contemplates the 
consequences for the fetus do not necessarily interfere” with her right to 
choose an abortion, and “we abandon the trimester framework as a rigid 
prohibition on all previability regulation aimed at the protection of fetal 
life.”182  The Court recognized that laws that make a right more difficult to 
exercise are not “ipso facto, an infringement of that right” and that a law 
“which serves a valid purpose, one not designed to strike at the right itself” and 
also has the “incidental effect” of making an abortion more difficult to obtain, 
is not invalid.183  Thus, only when a regulation imposes an “undue burden” on 
 
 179. Id. at 854-69.  For pointed criticism of the stare decisis justification, see Paul Benjamin 
Linton, Planned Parenthood v. Casey: The Flight From Reason in the Supreme Court, 13 ST. 
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 15 (1993).  Linton argues that the Court’s heavy reliance on stare decisis 
“is seriously undermined by its near total abandonment of Roe.”  Id. at 34.  Among other aspects 
in which Casey differs from Roe, Linton points out the following: 
Roe identified governmental interests in preserving maternal health and protecting the 
“potentiality of human life,” which interests become “compelling” at various stages of 
pregnancy, whereas Casey downgrades these interests to “legitimate” and “substantial.” 
Roe held that regulations limiting the exercise of the right of abortion had to be “narrowly 
drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake;” Casey holds that such 
regulation, if otherwise valid, need only be “reasonably related” to those interests. Roe 
effectively employed the “strict scrutiny” standard of review; Casey substitutes the 
“undue burden” standard. 
Id. 
 180. Casey, 505 U.S. at 860. 
 181. Id. at 872. 
 182. Id. (emphasis added).  In dissent, Justice Blackmun disagrees that the State can have an 
interest in a pre-viable fetus: “The viability line reflects the biological facts and truths of fetal 
development; it marks that threshold moment prior to which a fetus cannot survive separate from 
the woman and cannot reasonably and objectively be regarded as a subject of rights or interests 
distinct from, or paramount to, those of the pregnant woman.”  Id. at 932-33 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting in part). 
 183. Id. at 873-74. 
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the woman’s decision is the State prohibited from enacting it during the pre-
viability stage of pregnancy.184 
The Court went on to attempt a definition of “undue burden” and in doing 
so paved the way for the ongoing contentiousness surrounding the extent to 
which the State may intervene in pre-viability abortion decisions.  In general, 
“[a] finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state 
regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path 
of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”185  The State’s 
regulation must endeavor to inform rather than hinder the woman’s choice,186 
and, as a “guiding principle[]” regulations “which do no more than create a 
structural mechanism by which the State . . . may express profound respect for 
the life of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the 
woman’s exercise of the right to choose.”187  The Court summarized its 
“controlling principles” by saying that State “[m]easures designed to advance 
this interest [in potential life] should not be invalidated if their purpose is to 
persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion.”188 
In applying these principles to the case before it, the Casey Court upheld 
the medical emergency provision, the informed consent requirement, and the 
parental consent provisions of the Pennsylvania statute.189  In upholding the 
informed consent portion of the statute, which required the physician to 
provide the woman with certain pre-determined information regarding the 
abortion,190 the Court recognized that such information “furthers the legitimate 
 
 184. Id. at 874.  For a helpful brief history of the Court’s use of the undue burden standard 
prior to Casey, see Valerie J. Pacer, Salvaging the Undue Burden Standard—Is It A Lost Cause? 
The Undue Burden Standard and Fundamental Rights Analysis, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 295, 296-305 
(1995). 
 185. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.  In dissent, Justice Stevens says “[a] burden may be ‘undue’ 
either because [it] is too severe or because it lacks a legitimate, rational justification.”  Id. at 920 
(Stevens, J. dissenting). 
 186. Id. at 877.  Put another way, “a statute which, while furthering the interest in potential 
life or some other valid state interest, has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of 
a woman’s choice cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its legitimate ends.” Id. 
 187. Id.  A further guiding principle is that “[r]egulations designed to foster the health of a 
woman seeking an abortion are valid if they do not constitute an undue burden.”  Id. at 878. 
 188. Id. at 837.  Justice Stevens, in dissent, is critical of allowing the State to persuade a 
woman to chose childbirth over abortion, arguing that “Decisional autonomy must limit the 
State’s power to inject into a woman’s most personal deliberations its own views of what is 
best . . . .  [W]e have upheld regulations of abortion that are not efforts to sway or direct a 
woman’s choice, but rather are efforts to enhance the deliberative quality of that decision.”  Id. at 
916 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 189. Id. at 879-99. 
 190. Casey, 505 U.S. at 881. The statute requires that a woman certify in writing that at least 
twenty-four hours before the abortion the physician informs the woman of the nature and health 
risks of the procedure, the probable gestational age of the fetus, the availability of materials 
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[State] purpose of reducing the risk that a woman may elect an abortion, only 
to discover later, with devastating psychological consequences, that her 
decision was not fully informed.”191  The Court further allowed the State to 
require doctors to inform the woman of available materials explaining effects 
of abortion on the fetus, “even when those consequences have no direct 
relation to her health.”192  The Court also upheld the twenty-four hour waiting 
period element of the informed consent provision because even though the 
waiting period might impose a particular burden on some women, “[a] 
particular burden is not of necessity a substantial obstacle.”193 
The spousal notification provision of the statute was the only portion of the 
statute that did not survive the Court’s scrutiny.194  The district court findings 
included data on the prevalence of physical and psychological abuse of women 
at the hands of their husbands, including the fact that “[m]ere notification of 
pregnancy is frequently a flashpoint for battering and violence within the 
family.”195  In addition, the primary reason that married women do not notify 
their husbands when they are seeking an abortion is that they are experiencing 
marital difficulties which often involve violence.196  Thus, the spousal 
notification requirement “does not merely make abortions a little more 
difficult . . . to obtain;” instead, a significant number of women “are likely to 
be deterred from procuring an abortion as surely as if the Commonwealth had 
outlawed abortion in all cases.”197 
C. “Undue Burden” After Casey 
The question subsequent to Casey’s articulation of the undue burden 
standard is exactly what state action constitutes an undue, and therefore 
unconstitutional, burden on a woman’s right to choose an abortion.  As for 
guardianship appointments, courts have not analyzed the issue under the Casey 
standard, and indeed all of the subsequent litigation in the area has focused on 
statutes directly regulating abortion itself.  Therefore, an initial question may 
 
describing the fetus, information about medical assistance for childbirth, child support, and 
alternatives to abortion.  Id. 
 191. Id. at 882. 
 192. Id. 
We conclude . . . that informed choice need not be defined in such narrow terms that all 
considerations of the effect on the fetus are made irrelevant . . . . [When there is] a 
reasonable measure to ensure an informed choice, one which might cause the woman to 
choose childbirth over abortion.  This requirement cannot be considered a substantial 
obstacle to obtaining an abortion, and, it follows, there is no undue burden. 
Id. at 883. 
 193. Id. at 886-87. 
 194. Id. at 888. 
 195. Casey, 505 U.S. at 889. 
 196. Id. at 892. 
 197. Id. at 893-94. 
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be whether the Casey standard is an appropriate one for analyzing the question 
of guardianship appointments in abortion contexts because (1) a guardianship 
appointment is not an abortion statute or direct regulation as such, and (2) one 
might argue that a guardian’s role is as protector of the interests of the ward 
and not as a protector of the State’s interest.  As for the latter objection, one of 
the recognized purposes of guardianship appointments is the protection of a 
legitimate State interest.198  As one historian points out, the guardian is the 
“actual” protector on behalf of the “metaphysical entity” of the State. 199  As a 
metaphysical entity the State is only able to protect its interests indirectly 
through secondary means, and the main secondary means available in abortion 
related court proceedings is a guardian for the fetus.200  Because protection of 
the State’s interest in a court proceeding is dependent on protection of the fetus 
itself, the role of a guardian for the fetus is, at least in a formal sense, an 
appropriate role—though the question of whether the role constitutes an undue 
burden remains.201  As to the former objection, there is no indication in Casey 
or any of the subsequent undue burden cases that the standard applies only to 
statutory regulations or laws per se.  The function of a guardian in an abortion 
context is “regulatory” in nature because the appointment affects a woman’s 
abortion decision, so it properly falls within the Casey standard.202  For these 
reasons, the Casey standard is appropriate for analyzing the propriety of 
guardians for pre-viable fetuses. 
Only two types of regulations have “flunked” the undue burden test: partial 
birth abortion statutes and the spousal consent statute discussed in Casey 
itself.203  In their rulings, courts have emphasized Casey’s view that a 
regulation which has only the “‘incidental effect of making it more difficult or 
more expensive to procure an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it’”204 
and that “laws that regulate, not abortion itself, but ancillary issues . . . do not 
affect fundamental rights unless the ancillary rule creates an undue burden on 
the underlying right.”205 
 
 198. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 199. See supra note 30 and accompanying text 
 200. The court itself, in the form of the judge, cannot be the protector because the function of 
the court is to be an impartial arbiter rather than an advocate of any particular interest. 
 201. See infra Part III.D for a discussion of the contention that the State does not need a 
guardian to protect its interests because existing law fulfills that role. 
 202. See Silverstein, supra note 12 (applying the Casey undue burden standard to 
guardianship appointments for fetuses in judicial bypass proceedings for minors seeking 
abortions). 
 203. Woman’s Choice-East Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684, 691 (7th Cir. 
2002). 
 204. Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157, 166-67 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992)). 
 205. Newman, 305 F.3d at 688. 
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1. Partial-Birth Abortion Statutes 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Stenberg v. Carhart,206 in the area of 
partial birth abortion, the Sixth Circuit struck down an Ohio statute because it 
“inhibit[ed] the vast majority of second trimester abortions [and] would clearly 
have the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking 
the pre-viability abortion.”207  In Stenberg, using almost identical reasoning, 
the Court struck down a Nebraska statute outlawing partial birth abortion 
because it “impose[d] an undue burden on a woman’s ability to choose” D & E 
abortions, the most common second trimester abortion procedure.208  In her 
concurrence, Justice O’Connor made clear that the regulation was an undue 
burden because it proscribed “the most commonly used method for performing 
previability second trimester abortions.”209  The common theme in striking 
down these partial birth abortion statutes is the significant and direct 
proscription of common legal abortion procedures. 
2. Informed Consent Statutes 
Following this theme of requiring substantial proscription of abortion to 
invalidate a statute, courts have upheld the constitutionality of several other 
types of statutes.  In Karlin v. Foust, the Seventh Circuit upheld the 
constitutionality of a Wisconsin informed consent statute.210  The court noted 
that a regulation may be designed to ensure that a woman’s choice 
contemplates the consequences for the fetus, may express a profound respect 
for the life of the unborn, and may be designed to persuade a woman to choose 
 
 206. 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
 207. Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 201 (6th Cir. 1997).  For other 
pre-Stenberg decisions following this reasoning exactly, see also Planned Parenthood of Greater 
Iowa, Inc. v. Miller, 195 F.3d 386 (8th Cir. 1999); Little Rock Family Planning Services, P.A. v. 
Jegley, 192 F.3d 794 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 208. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930 (internal quotations omitted). 
 209. Id. at 949 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  See also Planned Parenthood v. Farmer, 220 F.3d 
127, 144-45 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding that the statute was “so vague as to be easily construed to ban 
even the safest, most common and readily available conventional pre- and post-viability abortion 
procedures” and that physicians would be “chilled” from performing these common types of 
abortions); Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Taft, 353 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2003) (upholding partial 
birth abortion statute that did not restrict the most commonly used procedure for second trimester 
abortions). 
 210. 188 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1999).  The statute at issue prohibited abortion unless the woman 
gave her voluntary and informed written consent.  Id. at 454.  To be voluntary, consent must be 
given freely and without coercion.  Id.  To be informed, the woman must be provided two tiers of 
information at least twenty-four hours before obtaining an abortion.  Id.  The first tier required a 
physician to meet with the woman in person and orally provide statutorily prescribed information.  
Id.  The second tier required a qualified person other than a physician to orally provide to the 
woman, in person at least twenty-four hours prior to the scheduled abortion, certain statutorily 
prescribed information along with certain state-provided printed materials.  Id. 
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childbirth over abortion if it is reasonably related to that goal.211  Significant to 
its analysis was that a pre-viability regulation by definition will burden a 
woman’s ability to obtain an abortion to some degree and that this level of 
interference from the state is constitutional.212  To be an undue burden “a 
challenged state regulation must have a strong likelihood of preventing women 
from obtaining abortions rather than merely making abortions more difficult to 
obtain.”213 
An important aspect of the Karlin court’s analysis dealt with the results of 
a Mississippi study showing that a similar statute caused (1) an 11 to 13% 
decrease in the number of Missisippi women undergoing reported abortions as 
compared with expected levels; (2) a 25% decrease in the number of 
Mississippi women obtaining abortions before reaching the nine-week point of 
their pregnancies as compared with expected levels; and (3) a 17% increase in 
the number of Mississippi women going out of state for abortions.214  The 
plaintiffs’ expert testified that the Mississippi mandatory waiting period was 
responsible for these results.215  In holding this evidence insufficient to support 
an undue burden conclusion, the court said that the Mississippi study’s “most 
significant shortcoming, however, is that it failed to adequately control for the 
persuasive effect of the law.”216  The court continued: 
Thus, to prove that an abortion regulation poses an undue burden on a woman 
under Casey, it is not enough for a plaintiff to show that the number of 
abortions declined after the passage of a state abortion regulation because that 
result is entirely consistent with a state’s legitimate interest in persuading a 
woman to carry her child to term. . . .  [T]he district court found that [the 
study] does not adequately explain the reason for the decline—whether the 
drop in abortions is attributable to the persuasive effects of the law or the 
difficulties in making two trips to an abortion facility.217 
 
 211. Id. at 479. 
 212. Id.  Justice Scalia, in his Casey dissent, is critical of the undue burden standard because it 
“may ultimately require the invalidation of each provision upheld today if it can be shown, on a 
better record, that the State is too effectively ‘express[ing] a preference for childbirth over 
abortion.’”  Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 992-93 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (quoting the majority opinion).  See also Silverstein supra note 12, at 
108-10 (arguing that the undue burden standard is inadequate because of its unintelligible 
“distinction between encouraging childbirth and hindering abortion”). 
 213. Karlin, 188 F.3d at 482.  The court adds the further important specification that the 
question is not whether the regulation would significantly restrict a majority of women seeking 
abortion, but rather, whether the regulation would significantly restrict the group of women to 
whom the regulation applies.  Id. at 481. 
 214. Id. at 486. 
 215. Id. at 486-87. 
 216. Id. at 487. 
 217. Id.  Put a slightly different way, “the Mississippi Study failed to prove that the drop in 
abortions in Mississippi is causally attributable to any unconstitutional effect of that state’s 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2004] A CHANGING OF THE GUARD 1455 
Finally, the court concluded that the purpose of the statute was not 
improper because there was no evidence that it was calculated to hinder rather 
than inform a woman’s free choice.218  Further, the court averred that a statute 
might be constitutional even if enacted with the purpose of interfering with a 
woman’s right to abortion if it does not have the actual effect of interfering 
with that right, so long as the regulation was reasonably related to the state’s 
interest in promoting childbirth over abortion.219 
3. Parental Consent Statutes  
Yet another area in which undue burden challenges have failed is parental 
consent statutes.  The Supreme Court, in its Bellotti decision of 1979, 
established that while a minor has a right to an abortion, a minor’s decision is 
“unique in many respects.”220  Specifically, there are three reasons the 
“constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those of adults: the 
peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an 
informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in child 
rearing.”221  Thus, states “validly may limit the freedom of children to choose 
for themselves in the making of important, affirmative choices with potentially 
serious consequences.”222  As a result, the Court allowed parental consent 
statutes so long as they include a judicial bypass provision allowing a minor to 
avoid the parental consent requirement in certain situations.223 
 
mandatory waiting period.”  Id. at 488.  A more recent Seventh Circuit decision has reaffirmed 
this holding on similar reasoning.  In A Woman’s Choice-East Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 
the court said that a decrease in abortion as a result of such a statute may show that “presenting 
the information in person is critical to its persuasive effect” and that a similar statute may not 
even have the same result in a different state.  305 F.3d 684, 690, 692 (7th Cir. 2002).  The court 
also said that an undue burden might exist if many women who strongly wanted an abortion have 
been blocked by increased cost in time and money, but that it would not be an undue burden (and 
is an equally plausible explanation for the decrease) if the decrease represents a percentage of all 
women who are “on the fence between ending pregnancy and carrying the pregnancy to term, so 
that even a modest cost tips the scales.”  Id. at 691. 
 218. Karlin, 188 F.3d at 493. 
 219. Id. at 494-95 (citing Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997)). 
[O]ur reading of Mazurek suggests that a state abortion regulation will survive an 
impermissible purpose challenge if it is a reasonable measure designed to further the 
state’s legitimate interest in protecting either the life of the fetus or the health of the 
mother; provided that it cannot be shown that the legislature deliberately intended the 
regulation to operate as a substantial obstacle to women seeking abortions. 
Id. at 494. 
 220. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979). 
 221. Id. at 634. 
 222. Id. at 635. 
 223. Id. at 643-44.  The minor is entitled to a proceeding to show “either: (1) that she is 
mature enough and well enough informed to make her abortion decision, in consultation with her 
physician, independently of her parents’ wishes; or (2) that even if she is not able to make this 
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In its undue burden analysis of a North Carolina parental consent statute, 
the Fourth Circuit found a preliminary injunction of the statute improper 
because there was not a “clear showing of irreparable injury which is neither 
remote nor speculative, but actual and imminent.”224  The court also found a 
lack of a causal link between the Act and the alleged injuries to minors, noting 
that the delays in obtaining an abortion could be caused by the actions of 
minors rather than by the provisions of the Act.225  The court observed that: 
Merely recounting the trauma and risks involved in teen pregnancy . . . is not 
sufficient to preliminarily enjoin enforcement of a parental consent statute . . . .  
The Court agrees that young pregnant minors have a need for . . . support. . . .  
But in no case have the Appellants tied these needs to a harm directly caused 
by the Act.226 
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit recognized that a State may not erect a 
procedural hurdle designed simply to make it more difficult to obtain an 
abortion.  However, it held a requirement that a minor appeal a judicial bypass 
decision within twenty-four hours was not an undue burden even though the 
statute might pose some hardship for some women seeking an appeal.227  In 
response to the dissent’s claim that some minors would be precluded from 
effectively pursuing a judicial bypass, the majority said: 
[E]very added procedure will necessarily cause some hardship, yet not every 
procedural obstacle to an abortion creates an undue burden.  In addition, any 
procedure will, in conjunction with some conceivable set of circumstances, 
prevent some minor from effectively pursuing a judicial bypass . . . . and the 
fact that some minors will be practically precluded . . . from pursuing a judicial 
bypass does not mean that the procedure is unconstitutional. 228 
 
decision independently, the desired abortion would be in her best interests.”  The proceedings 
must also insure the anonymity of the minor and proceed expeditiously.  Id. 
 224. Manning v. Hunt, 119 F.3d 254, 264 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal quotations omitted).  
Plaintiffs argued that the Act posed an undue burden based on six different aspects of the Act, 
including language dealing with expediency and various procedural requirements for the minor.  
Id. at 258. 
 225. Id. at 265. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Memphis Planned Parenthood, Inc. v. Sundquist, 175 F.3d 456, 462 (6th Cir. 1999).  
Planned Parenthood argued that the provision impermissibly shifts the burden of acting 
expeditiously to the pregnant minor.  Id. 
 228. Id. at 463 n.3.  For other examples of circuit court decisions dealing with parental 
consent statutes, see Planned Parenthood v. Lawall, 307 F.3d 783 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that 
Arizona’s judicial bypass provision satisfied the Supreme Court requirements and was not an 
undue burden); Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452 (8th Cir. 1995) 
(striking down a South Dakota abortion regulation because, inter alia, the parental notification 
provision did not include a judicial bypass option); Barnes v. Mississippi, 992 F.2d 1335, 1340 
(5th Cir. 1993) (upholding as constitutional a Mississippi statute’s parental consent requirement 
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4. Additional Regulations 
In addition to these three main areas of undue burden litigation, some 
circuits have applied the analysis in other areas.  For example, the Eighth 
Circuit held constitutional a Missouri statute preventing abortion service 
providers from receiving state family planning funds.229  The court said the 
statute was “intended to effectuate the State’s constitutionally permissible 
decision to favor childbirth over abortion, and any effects limiting women’s 
access to abortion services are strictly incidental” and thus not an undue 
burden.230  In Mazurek v. Armstrong, the Supreme Court upheld a Montana 
statute restricting performance of abortions to licensed physicians.231  The 
Court said even assuming that a legislative purpose to interfere with the right 
to abortion without the effect of interfering could invalidate the law, there was 
no basis for finding an illegitimate legislative purpose in this case.232 
In Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant, the Fourth Circuit upheld a South 
Carolina statute establishing licensure and operational requirements for 
physicians’ offices and medical clinics performing five or more first trimester 
abortions per month.233  The court below found that the regulation served no 
legitimate state interest, and even if it did, it constituted an undue burden 
because of increased costs, delays in the ability to get abortions, decreased 
availability of abortion clinics, increased travel distances to clinics, and 
unlimited inspections of clinics and compromises to patient confidentiality.234  
In reversing this decision, the court said a facial challenge to a statute can 
succeed only based on expert predictions rather than on actual data as applied 
to South Carolina patients.235  “Such anticipation, however, is generally not an 
appropriate basis on which to strike down statutes and regulations.”236  The 
court then concluded there was no evidence that the statute was an undue 
burden, and “[o]nly when the increased cost of abortion is prohibitive, 
essentially depriving women of the choice to have an abortion, has the Court 
invalidated regulations because they impose financial burdens.”237  Finally, the 
 
requiring the consent of two parents, even though the two-parent requirement would 
“incrementally increase the burden on the minor’s exercise of her right to get an abortion”). 
 229. Planned Parenthood of Mid-Missouri and Eastern Kansas, Inc. v. Dempsey, 167 F.3d 
458 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 230. Id. at 465. 
 231. 520 U.S. 968 (1997). 
 232. Id. at 972.  “We do not assume unconstitutional legislative intent even when statutes 
produce harmful results; much less do we assume it when the results are harmless.”  Id. (citation 
omitted). 
 233. 222 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 234. Id. at 163. 
 235. Id. at 164. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. at 167.  The estimated increase in cost as a result of the licensing requirements in this 
case was $23-$75 per abortion.  Id. at 170. 
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court commented that Casey had replaced the Roe strict scrutiny standard with 
the undue burden standard, which asks “not whether [the standard] serves a 
compelling state interest, but whether it ‘serves a valid purpose.’”238 
5. Summary of Post-Casey Undue Burden Jurisprudence 
One need only look to the courts’ language since Casey to see that the 
undue burden test has not been favorable to abortion regulation challenges.  In 
the only two areas in which the courts have found an undue burden—partial 
birth and spousal consent statutes—the records were replete with evidence that 
the statute would cause large-scale prevention of legal abortions.  In all 
decisions upholding the regulations, terms such as “proscription,” 
“prevention,” and “significant” reverberate as the effects required before a 
regulation will be declared unconstitutional.  Courts have required a significant 
showing of significant and direct prevention of abortion to strike down a 
regulation and have upheld statutes causing some financial and logistical 
obstacles to abortion.  Courts also have distinguished “ancillary” regulations 
from regulations that directly impact access to abortion, indicating that 
ancillary regulations are constitutional absent a clear showing of undue burden 
so long as they bear a rational relation to the state’s interest in protecting 
potential life. We now turn to the application of these principles to fetal 
guardian appointments in court proceedings involving minors seeking judicial 
bypasses and incompetent mothers whose decision regarding the pregnancy is 
in the hands of a guardian. 
D. Guardians in Abortion-Related Court Proceedings 
1. Minors Seeking Judicial Bypass of Parental Consent Requirements 
a. Case Law 
The Florida Supreme Court considered the question of a guardian in the 
context of a minor seeking a judicial bypass for a first trimester abortion.239  
 
 238. Bryant, 222 F.3d at 173 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 
(1992)).  See also Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Casey: “Roe decided that a woman had a 
fundamental right to an abortion.  The joint opinion rejects that view.  Roe decided that abortion 
regulations were to be subjected to ‘strict scrutiny’ and could be justified only in the light of 
‘compelling state interests.’  The joint opinion rejects that view.”  Casey, 505 U.S. at 954 
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-64 (1973)). 
 239. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1189 (Fla. 1989).  For criticism of the judicial bypass 
system, see Jennifer Blasdell, Mother, May I?: Ramifications For Parental Involvement Laws For 
Minors Seeking Abortion Services, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 287, 288-93 (2002) 
(arguing that bypass proceedings burden minors’ health and compromise minors’ rights to 
confidential medical care); see also J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Grounded in the Reality of Their Lives: 
Listening to Teens Who Make the Abortion Decision Without Involving Their Parents, 18 
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The guardian ad litem for the fetus argued at the trial court hearing that the 
judicial bypass portion of the statute was unconstitutionally vague and parental 
consent must therefore be required in every instance where a minor seeks an 
abortion.240  The trial court declared the bypass provision unconstitutionally 
vague, but did so in favor of the minor and granted the bypass.241  The 
guardian ad litem then filed several unsuccessful motions to block the abortion, 
the minor obtained an abortion, and the guardian ad litem appealed to the 
Florida Supreme Court.242  With no rationale and no citation to precedent, the 
court summarily condemned the appointment of the guardian for the fetus: 
“Preliminarily, we find that the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the 
fetus was clearly improper.”243 
The Alabama Supreme Court gave no analysis of the propriety of 
appointing a guardian in general, limiting its discussion to whether a nonviable 
fetus has a right to appeal a judicial bypass order through its guardian ad 
litem.244  As Helen Silverstein points out, the court’s opinion rejected the right 
of the guardian to appeal but did not reject or confirm the decision of the trial 
court to appoint the guardian in the first place.245  According to Silverstein, 
with four justices indicating that trial courts may appoint guardians ad litem in 
waiver hearings and five justices remaining silent on the point, trial courts in 
Alabama now have discretion to appoint guardians in these proceedings.246  In 
concurrence and dissent, several justices took up the argument the majority had 
refused to address, suggesting that the trial court did have the authority to 
appoint a guardian under a court procedure rule requiring a guardian “when the 
interest of an infant unborn or unconceived is before the court.”247  One justice 
 
BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 61, 173 (2003) (reporting that minors describe going to the bypass 
hearing as “frightening, nerve-wracking, and humiliating”). 
 240. T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1189. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. at 1190. 
 244. In re Anonymous, 720 So. 2d 497, 498 (Ala. 1998) (holding that the guardian ad litem 
did not have statutory authority to appeal an order granting the waiver of parental consent to have 
an abortion because the legislature did not provide such a right). 
 245. Silverstein, supra note 12, at 85. 
 246. Id. at 86.  In fact, Silverstein’s research shows that at least two judges in Alabama trial 
courts appoint such guardians as a matter of routine.  Id.  Also of note in this case was the 
guardian’s tactics in examining the minor at the hearing.  The guardian questioned her about her 
familiarity with certain Bible scripture and asked whether she was aware that, by choosing 
abortion, she would be “snuffing out” the life of her child.  Id. at 70.  In addition, the guardian 
used words like “kill” to describe abortion and the waiver lasted nearly four hours (compared to a 
normal proceeding that ordinarily lasts 30 minutes).  Id. at 82-83.  Because Silverstein sees this 
line of questioning as a somewhat isolated type of activity by a guardian, she still concludes that 
the appointments pass constitutional muster.  Id. at 88-89. 
 247. Anonymous, 720 So. 2d at 499 n.2 (quoting ALA. R. CIV. P. 17(c)). 
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argued that because Alabama required such an appointment under the rule in 
divorce proceedings, a similar interpretation should apply here.248 
b. Guardians for Fetuses? 
Helena Silverstein’s analysis of this issue in Alabama courts is the only 
significant treatment to date and provides a touchstone for this analysis.  
Silverstein argues that appointing guardians ad litem in judicial bypass 
proceedings does pass constitutional muster, but she views this conclusion as 
“reveal[ing] serious shortcomings in Casey.”249  Under Casey, Silverstein 
admits, a regulation will be an undue burden only if it has “the purpose or 
effect of stopping women from obtaining safe abortions.  That women would 
confront considerable challenges . . . is not sufficient to find the measure 
constitutionally flawed.”250  Further, “[w]e can fairly surmise, then, that the 
joint opinion establishes that states may hinder abortion, at least insofar as the 
encouragement of childbirth constitutes a hindrance to abortion . . . . This, 
then, is what undue burden means: Regulations that fall short of stopping 
abortion and do not entail health risks are permissible, regardless of their 
otherwise burdensome qualities.”251 
Silverstein, then, though opposing guardianship appointments, finds them 
constitutionally permissible under Casey.  This conclusion undoubtedly is 
supported by the post-Casey cases discussed above.  The guardian has no 
power to prevent, proscribe, or make the procurement of abortion for minors 
effectively illegal. Even the most anti-abortion guardian under the supervision 
of the most anti-abortion judge, such as the one in Alabama that Silverstein 
discusses, can attempt only to persuade the minor to choose childbirth over 
abortion, a purpose explicitly condoned in Casey and its progeny.252  The 
 
 248. Id. at 502 (Hooper, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 249. Silverstein, supra note 12, at 108-10.  Interestingly, Silverstein suggests that the same 
constitutional argument justifying guardians for fetuses in judicial bypass proceedings 
theoretically justifies requiring a competent adult woman to discuss her abortion decision with a 
guardian who speaks for the fetus.  In Silverstein’s view, such a requirement would certainly 
“strik[e] at the heart of liberty,” but could be justified under the “permissive character” of the 
undue burden standard.  Id. at 108-10.  “If states may, consistent with the undue burden test, 
require that a woman—minor or adult—be questioned by an agent of the fetus, then there is 
something fundamentally wrong with that test.”  Id. at 110.  The problem, in part, is the lack of a 
principled distinction between encouraging childbirth and hindering abortion, and thus “the 
notion of ‘substantial obstacle’ becomes a euphemism for those regulations that prevent abortion 
or pose substantial health risks for women.”  Id.  A discussion of whether Silverstein is right 
about this extension to adult women under Casey is outside of the scope of this Comment. 
 250. Id. at 96. 
 251. Id. at 96-97. 
 252. Silverstein reaches her conclusion on constitutionality even though some guardians have 
used tactics that are improper in her view and even though the avowed aim of guardians who 
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guardian as an officer of the court simply has no power to accomplish the 
prevention of abortion required to fail the undue burden test. 
Even if a guardian’s presence had the effect of hindering some minors 
from succeeding in their judicial bypass efforts, regulations that merely cause 
some hardship are not invalid.253  In fact, “every added procedure will 
necessarily cause some hardship” and such hardship is rarely sufficient to 
invalidate the regulation.254  Indeed, no such body of evidence exists to support 
an undue burden conclusion with respect to guardians.  Furthermore, as 
evidenced in Karlin v. Foust and Memphis Planned Parenthood, Inc. v. 
Sundquist, even a substantial decrease in the granting of judicial bypasses 
would implicate guardian appointments only if there is an additional showing 
that the decrease is causally related to an unconstitutional element of the 
guardian’s activities.  Without such a showing, the decrease may be causally 
related to the constitutionally legitimate persuasive power of the guardian.255  
In addition, even if a substantial number of courts began to deny judicial 
bypasses and the decrease could be causally linked to the presence of the 
guardian, a plaintiff still would have to show that a significant number of 
minors were then unable to obtain an abortion through parental consent.  
Denial of a judicial bypass is not denial of an abortion; it simply means 
parental consent is required.  Finally, if there is a decrease in minors seeking 
judicial bypass in the first place, implicating the guardian in this decrease 
would require evidence that minors’ knowledge of the presence of a guardian 
in the proceeding was the cause of the chilling effect rather than some other 
difficult element of teenage pregnancy.256 
The arguments above indicate reasons why a successful constitutional 
challenge to guardianship appointments would be nearly impossible to mount.  
There is also a significant positive reason to appoint a guardian to protect the 
State’s interest in potential life—to ensure that the laws promulgated by the 
state’s legislature are administered fairly and impartially.  In minor judicial 
bypass proceedings, the State has passed a parental consent law allowing a 
judicial bypass only on a specific, Supreme Court-mandated showing of the 
 
represent fetuses is, through their questioning and calling of witnesses, to convince the minor to 
carry the fetus to term.  Id. at 88; see supra note 243. 
 253. Note as well language in cases that have even indicated that an improper purpose will 
not sustain a challenge in the absence of an improper effect.  Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 494 
(7th Cir. 1999). 
 254. Memphis Planned Parenthood v. Sundquist, 175 F.3d 456, 463 n.3 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 255. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 180-93. 
 256. Manning v. Hunt, 119 F.3d 254, 265 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that the trauma and risks 
involved in teenage pregnancy are not sufficient to strike down a parental consent statute).  See 
Ehrlich, supra note 237, at 186-87 for a description of teen anxiety in facing bypass proceedings 
without guardians.  That this anxiety already exists would make a showing that a guardian was 
the cause of a significant chilling effect very difficult. 
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minor’s decision-making maturity or that the abortion is in the best interests of 
the minor.  This determination involves offering evidence and examining the 
minor.  A guardian’s role in challenging evidence, offering counter evidence 
and examining the minor would aid the court in making a proper 
determination.  This ensures that the proceeding is not simply a rubber stamp 
on the minor’s desire to avoid seeking parental consent.  The appointment of a 
guardian surely bears a rational relation to these goals of protecting the State’s 
interest in the fetus and in the just administration of the laws of its legislature.  
The appointment of a guardian for fetuses in this context does not pose an 
undue burden on a minor’s right to choose an abortion.  Further, it is a 
legitimate mechanism to protect the State’s interest in the life of the fetus and 
to encourage childbirth over abortion. 
2. Mentally Incompetent Mothers and the Abortion Choice 
a. Case law 
The final section of this Comment will discuss the propriety of appointing 
guardians in proceedings involving a mother’s alleged incompetence.  In re 
D.K. involved a schizophrenic woman who was pregnant with a non-viable 
fetus.257  A court-appointed guardian for the fetus obtained a court order 
restraining hospital personnel from treating the mother with medication 
harmful to the fetus and restraining her from consenting to or requesting an 
abortion.258  The guardian filed an additional suit seeking to declare D.K. 
legally incompetent, but before a decision could be reached on the issue, D.K. 
was discharged from the hospital.259  Immediately thereafter, D.K. moved to 
dismiss the incompetency action and in doing so challenged the right of the 
fetus to be represented and the standing of its guardian to file a complaint on 
its behalf.260 
In holding the appointment of the guardian for the fetus improper, the New 
Jersey Superior Court found support in Roe for the proposition that “it is the 
mother who controls the fetus, until viability occurs, not the reverse.”261  Thus, 
the appointment of a guardian for a fetus, prior to viability, is improper 
because “the unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in the 
whole sense and . . . during the first trimester of pregnancy a decision may be 
reached and effectuated to abort the fetus, free of any interference by the 
 
 257. In re D.K., 497 A.2d 1298, 1300 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985). 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. at 1301. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. at 1302. “If the mother is incompetent control must be exercised through a guardian.” 
Id. 
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state.”262  In addition, court rules provided for appointment of a guardian ad 
litem for a minor, but not a fetus, and thus the appointment stood outside the 
statutory authority of the court.263  Finally, the lower court lacked in personam 
jurisdiction for the purpose of appointing a guardian because the fetus was not 
a person.264 
A New York appellate court considered the case of Nancy Klein, who was 
seventeen weeks pregnant and a comatose patient in a hospital as a result of 
brain damage.265  At the same time Klein’s husband applied to be her 
temporary guardian, the court denied the petition of a stranger to be guardian 
of the non-viable fetus.266  Echoing the reasoning in In re D.K., the appellate 
court upheld the denial of the application for guardianship of the fetus 
“because a non-viable fetus, i.e., one less than 24 weeks old, is not a legally 
recognized ‘person’ for the purposes of proceedings such as these [and] [t]he 
State has no compelling interest in the protection of the fetus prior to 
viability.”267 
A Florida appellate court considered the involuntary commitment of a 
pregnant mother suffering from severe psychosis.268  The trial court had 
appointed an attorney ad litem for the fetus, who favored termination of the 
pregnancy because it would be in the best interest of the fetus and the 
mother.269  The court sought authority to terminate the pregnancy and put on 
evidence showing the severe effects of the psychosis and the danger that 
normal childbirth would pose to the mother and child.270  The trial court 
authorized termination of the pregnancy, but the appellate court reversed on 
procedural grounds.271  The court did not comment on the propriety of 
appointing a guardian for the fetus. 
In re Jane A. considered whether, under the doctrine of substituted 
judgment, a mentally incompetent person would choose to terminate her 
eighteen-and-a-half week pregnancy.272  As an initial matter, the court of 
appeals noted with approval that the Probate Court judge was “conscientious in 
 
 262. D.K., 497 A.2d at 1302 (quoting Rothenberger v. Doe, 374 A.2d 57, 58 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 
Ch. Div. 1977)) (internal quotations omitted) (also holding that the appointment of a guardian for 
the fetus was improper). 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. at 1303. 
 265. In re Klein, 538 N.Y.S.2d 274, 275 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989). 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Lefebvre v. N. Broward Hosp. Dist., 566 So. 2d 568, 569 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990). 
Without lithium to control her psychosis, the mother was violent, abusive and uncontrollable and 
that use of lithium would result in severe damage to the fetus.  Id. 
 269. Id. at 570. 
 270. Id. at 569-70. 
 271. Id. at 570-71. 
 272. In re Jane A., 629 N.E.2d 1337, 1338 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994). 
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appointing persons who would examine the question from various points of 
view” including a guardian ad litem “‘to oppose a determination that [the 
ward], if competent, would choose to have an abortion.’”273  Because there 
would possibly be adverse consequences with both childbirth and abortion, the 
trial court said “‘we cannot presuppose that [the ward], if competent, would 
disregard the fetus as an important factor in her decision’. . .[thus] the ward’s 
‘decision, if competent, would be not to consent to an abortion.’”274  After a 
reexamination of the record revealed a significantly greater danger to the 
mother if she proceeded with the pregnancy, the court of appeals reversed.  
This led to the conclusion that were she competent, she would have chosen to 
terminate her pregnancy.275 
In the most recent case at the time of this writing, a Florida appellate court 
held the appointment of a guardian for a viable fetus improper.276  The case 
involved a twenty-two-year-old woman who was pregnant as a result of sexual 
battery and was suffering from severe mental retardation, cerebral palsy, 
autism and a seizure disorder.277  According to the court, the absence of the 
term “fetus” in the state’s guardianship statute and the clear inclusion of the 
term by the Florida legislature in statutes designed to protect fetuses meant the 
statute did not extend to fetuses.278  In addition, the term “ward” in the Florida 
statutes “means a person for whom a guardian has been appointed” and “[i]t 
follows that a fetus must be considered a ‘person’ to be appointed a 
guardian.”279  No Florida case or statute had ever determined the fetus to be a 
person.280  Further, Florida law provided other safeguards to ensure that any 
 
 273. Id. at 1338 n.1 (citing In re Moe, 432 N.E.2d 712 (Mass. 1982)). In addition, the judge 
appointed a temporary guardian with authority concerning medical issues, counsel for Jane, and a 
guardian ad litem to investigate the substituted judgment question with respect to abortion.  Id. 
 274. Id. at 1340. 
 275. Id. at 1340-41.  Among the evidence that the appellate court considered was Jane’s 
inconsistent testimony on whether she understood what her pregnancy meant and whether she 
wanted it to continue.  The court also considered expert testimony that continuing the pregnancy 
could undo the progress Jane had made through years of behavioral therapy and that the 
probability of harm would be “a thousand fold” greater if she proceeded with the pregnancy 
instead of terminating it.  Id. at 1340. 
 276. In re J.D.S., 864 So. 2d 534, 539 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2004). 
 277. Id. at 536. 
 278. Id. at 538. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. In a concurrence continuing this discussion of the lack of personhood of the fetus, the 
concurring justice makes extensive use of Roe’s requirement that state regulation of a 
fundamental right is justified only by a compelling state interest.  Id. at 541 (Orginger, J., 
concurring).  This reasoning is inexplicable because even under Roe a state may proscribe 
abortion after the third trimester without showing a compelling interest.  Only the dissent 
mentions Casey, arguing that the trial court was obligated to determine if the appointment of a 
guardian for the fetus constituted an undue burden and that in this case it did not.  Id. at 546 
(Pleus, J., dissenting). 
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decision in favor of abortion made by the mother’s guardian would not be 
capricious or cavalier.281  By contrast, in the dissent’s view, the appointment of 
a guardian would “greatly assist” the court in protecting its interest in the life 
of the fetus, and “[w]ithout the appointment of a guardian . . . there will be an 
inherent conflict of interest in the protection of the ward and the unborn 
child.”282  The dissent said the denial of a guardian “nullified the only effective 
mechanism and non-burdensome method by which the State can fulfill its 
duty.”283 
b. Guardians for Fetuses? 
Is it proper to appoint a guardian for a fetus in court proceedings involving 
an incompetent mother’s “choice” about abortion?  The first consideration is 
whether the Florida appellate court and others before it are right when they 
conclude that a guardian cannot be appointed for a fetus because statutes do 
not specify fetuses as proper wards.  As I have argued above, this argument is a 
red herring in view of the court’s equitable power to appoint guardians.284  
Similarly, the argument that lack of fetal personhood precludes the 
appointment is belied by the strong State interest in protecting fetal life285 and 
by the “rational relation” of a guardianship appointment as a means toward that 
end.286  In the J.D.S. case, the ACLU of Florida contended that the State does 
not need a guardian to protect its interests in a viable fetus because once a fetus 
becomes viable Florida law already limits the availability of abortion for all 
women.287  According to the brief, Florida law prohibits a woman from having 
an abortion after the twenty-fourth week of pregnancy unless “‘termination of 
pregnancy is necessary to save the life or preserve the health of the pregnant 
woman’” and thus existing law already protects the State’s interest.288  The 
 
 281. J.D.S., 864 So. 2d at 539. 
 282. Id. at 546 (Pleus, J., dissenting). 
 283. Id. 
 284. See discussion supra Part I. 
 285. All of the cases other than J.D.S. that reject guardianship appointments for pre-viable 
fetuses on non-personhood grounds did so prior to Casey’s articulation of the undue burden 
standard. 
 286. In its brief, the ACLU argued that “As a threshold matter, Florida law only permits the 
appointment of guardians for ‘persons.’  A fetus, however, is not a person under the guardianship 
statutes.” Renewed Brief of Amici Curiae ACLU et. al. at 3, In re J.D.S., 864 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (No. 5D03-1921).  The brief makes the same lack of personhood argument 
under the United States and Florida Constitutions.  Id. at 11.  See supra Part II.B.1.c for detailed 
criticism of this argument. 
 287. Renewed Brief of Amici Curiae ACLU et. al, at 18, J.D.S. (No. 5D03-1921).  This 
specific contention in the Florida case takes us outside the realm of undue burden analysis 
momentarily because that standard governs only pre-viability regulations. 
 288. Id. at 19 (quoting FLA. STAT. ch. 390.0111(1)(a) (2003)). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1466 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:1419 
ACLU brief claims that the law applies no differently to J.D.S than to any 
other woman in Florida.289 
This argument fails because it does not recognize the fundamental 
difference between the J.D.S. situation and the situation of any other woman in 
Florida.  The difference is that J.D.S. herself is not making the abortion 
decision.  Instead, a court-appointed guardian woman is making the decision 
based on a determination of J.D.S’s best interests as ward under the law 
proscribing abortions for viable fetuses except when the mother’s life or health 
are in danger.  In this context, the State has a clear interest to ensure that the 
third-party decisionmaker for the incompetent woman properly assesses the 
danger to the mother’s life and health, which is required in making the 
determination.  Such a third-party determination will involve examination of 
the medical situation and the risks involved in abortion versus the risks 
involved in carrying the pregnancy to term.  To emphasize this point, one of 
the amici curiae briefs filed in the J.D.S. case documents numerous procedural 
violations that occurred in another Florida case that authorized the abortion of 
a mentally incompetent woman’s fetus.290  The brief argues that the hearing of 
evidence and the standard of review used by the judge to determine whether 
the mother was at sufficient risk to authorize an abortion violated statutory 
requirements.  At the very least, a guardian for the fetus was necessary to 
“ensure that testimony concerning the health and life risks of the mother 
because of pregnancy are fully cross-examined to examine competency, 
veracity and motive.”291  The laws proscribing abortion do not in themselves 
ensure protection of the State’s interest when a third-party decisionmaker 
makes the determination for the woman.  Thus, a State needs a guardian to 
protect its interest in the life of a viable fetus. 
Is the appointment, then, an undue burden when pre-viable fetuses are 
involved?  As discussed in the preceding paragraph, the question raises slightly 
different issues than those raised by minor judicial bypass appointments 
because in these cases an incompetent woman cannot properly be said to make 
the choice herself.  Because of this, the analysis as to whether the guardian 
properly informs the woman’s choice or is an improper substantial obstacle 
under Casey is somewhat forced.  Obviously, the guardian of an incompetent 
woman faces a more difficult task in seeking an abortion if a guardian for the 
fetus is present to protect the State’s interest.  However, there is no evidence 
that this added challenge would present the kind of preventative or proscriptive 
bar to abortion that the undue burden jurisprudence requires for 
 
 289. Id. at 18-19.  It is important to note that in the case of a viable fetus, the state may not 
only regulate abortion under Casey but may even proscribe it. 
 290. Brief of Amici Curiae Florida Right to Life, Inc. et. al. at 5-10, In re J.D.S., 864 So. 2d 
534 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (No. 5D03-1921). 
 291. Id. at 10. 
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unconstitutionality.  The guardian’s role as a structural mechanism to protect 
the potential life of the fetus and even to exert persuasive power in favor of 
childbirth falls within the allowable ways the State may vindicate its interest.  
A guardian does not have the ultimate power to “make effectively illegal” the 
specific abortion sought in a particular case, much less a significant number of 
common abortion procedures for a significant number of women.  In the case 
of incompetent women, because there is no possibility of a chilling effect on a 
substantial number within the group of women the regulation would impact, 
the guardian could hardly be said to “strike at the heart” of the abortion choice.  
Instead the appointment of a guardian is an “ancillary” regulation that is 
designed to aid the court in considering the best interests of the fetus as a 
means to protect the State interest in the fetus, and is not an undue burden on a 
woman’s right to choose.  Thus, while different standards and justifications 
govern the decision in abortion and non-abortion contexts, the necessity of 
balancing interests in both arenas requires the appointment of guardians for 
fetuses. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The appointment of guardians for fetuses in court proceedings involving a 
maternal-fetal conflict is an appropriate and necessary mechanism for 
protection of fetal rights and State interests in non-abortion contexts and for 
protection of the State’s interest in potential fetal life in abortion contexts.  A 
question that this Comment undoubtedly raises, but does not attempt to answer, 
is whether under the logic of the argument such appointments could be 
required whenever a competent woman pursues an abortion.  Helena 
Silverstein argues that the inadequacy of Casey “to intelligibly distinguish 
between encouraging childbirth and hindering abortion” could lead to the 
conclusion that may require a woman—minor or adult—to be questioned by an 
agent of the fetus.292  While Silverstein may be right about this, I predict that 
such a requirement would be found to be an undue burden under current law.  
Be that as it may, the arguments advanced here are intentionally limited to the 
types of court proceedings discussed throughout in an effort to advocate proper 
application of the law in this area as currently written. 
Although this Comment argues that the appointment of a guardian for a 
fetus is not dependent upon statutory authorization, states should rewrite their 
guardianship statutes to include fetuses in the types of cases discussed here.  
Hopefully, the Comment has provided sufficient argument to support the 
 
 292. Silverstein, supra note 12, at 110; see also Renewed Brief of Amici Curiae ACLU et. al. 
at 18, In re J.D.S., 864 So. 2d 534 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (No. 5D03-1921) (stating that 
“[i]ndeed, if third parties are allowed to represent the fetus under these circumstances, there is no 
logical reason they would not seek to do so in the case of a competent pregnant woman 
considering an abortion or medical treatment detrimental to her fetus.”). 
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legitimacy of such statutes.  The appointment of guardians for fetuses is 
responsive to the fact that states are increasingly recognizing fetal rights that 
sometimes conflict with a mother’s rights, and that in such cases the fetuses’ 
rights must be heard and defended.  In abortion cases, the State’s interest in 
potential life must also be protected by the appointment of guardians.  Under 
current law, “the fundamental dilemma” certainly does remain the balancing of 
the rights of the fetus and the rights of pregnant women. 293  So long as the law 
creates space in which this balancing must occur, guardians for fetuses ought 
to play a vital role in this process. 
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